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INTRODUCTION 
One of the main problems of man's economic exist-
-
ence from ancient times has been c01mnercial organization. 
Man has always been a complex individual. The desire for 
freedom has always been at variance with the necessity for 
authoritative organization, and as a result the problem of 
business organization has always been difficult to solve. 
Economics in its essence has to do with the science of 
supplying the material needs of ma.n. In ancient times 
the methods for supplying man's fundamental necessities 
and desires were simple. But, as civilization developed, 
naturally the laws governing the methods of satisfying 
these needs became more compl-icated. Thus we find that 
there was a strong incentive for the development of more 
efficient methods for fulfilling man's desires. It is in 
answer to this demand that the origin of the corporation 
as a form of business organization will be found. And 
throughout the pages of all subsequent history we find 
that man ha.s devoted much time and effort to the evolution 
of this form of conunercial organization. 
The object of this paper is to give the reader a 
more complete understanding of the corporation as an in-
strument of business concentration by showing its develop-
ment in the past. A treatise such as this is naturally 
limited in scope, but there are several important divisions 
v 
to this subject which must be treated. The origin and 
early history of the simple corporate entity is the 
logical starting point in this study. The next impor-
tant step in the development of the corporation will be 
treated in the second chapter, entitled "The Corporation 
and the Modern Combination Movement". The economic as-
pect of this movement will then be explained. In 
conclusion, the present position of the corporation as a 
method of concentration and the principal social problems 
arising therefrom will be examined. 
The course of the evolution of the corporation 
was not simple or uninteresting. For it is closely con-
nected with the spread of Roman law and the history of 
western Europe. During the period following the downfall 
of the Roman Empire, the co~rnercial aspect of the corpora-
tion was all but lost. War and hard times encompassed 
Europe and commercial progress was retarded. During this 
period the ~orporation found its main use in municipal and 
church organizations. 
It was not until the period of exploration and 
colonization of the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
that the real potentiality of the corporation was dis-
covered. Up until that time the commercial use of the 
corporation had been limited. The reason for this, 
however, is not primarily to be found in the corporation 
as a form of organization but in the slow development of 
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mechanical invention. But the perpetuation of the cor-
porate idea was an important contribution of that era. 
Vfhen the time came for the utilization of this method of 
organization, the corporation was in exi3tence. 
The development of the corporation during the 
nineteenth century was fostered by the invention of mass 
production machinery and cheaper and more efficient 
methods of transportation. The principle of free and 
equal incorporation in the United States reflected not 
only the economic demand but the sociological ideology 
of the people. One of the principal developments of the 
nineteenth century was the tremendous increase in size of 
the corporation. 
However, it is in the modern development of the 
corporation, since 1870, that we find it maturing into a 
commercial instrwnent of great importance. The dorporate 
form of business organization has had a tremendous in-
fluence in the financial and industrial affairs of the 
modern world and particularly in the United States. 
President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University 
said, in an address in 1911, "I weigh my words when I say 
that in my judgment the limited liability corporation is 
the greatest single discovery of modern times ••• Even 
steam and electricity are far less important than the · 
limited liability corporation". 1 
1. From an address of President Nicholas Murray Butler 
of Columbia University, delivered before the 143rd 
annual banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of New York. 
VII 
The development of the corporation has not been 
without abuses. Today, in as much as we are in the grip 
of a major depression, we are forced to examine the whole 
economic system with a critical eye. It is generally 
conceded that the giant corporations of today hold a 
unique position in the economic and social life of the 
community. In this respect, one author compares our 
present corporate system to the feudal system of land 
tenure. If this is so, is it the most satisfactory sys-
tem of business organization which we can develop? Vlhat 
the future course of the corporation is we do not know. 
But in the past the corporation has had two prominent 
characteristics. The first is its use by governments, to 
manage affairs not directly in the scope of public welfare. 
The second factor is the continued growth in size of the 
corporation. There are two important developments in the 
field of corporate usage. The first is increased govern-
ment regulation of the large corporation. The second 
factor in the same category is the incree.sed trend toward 
nationalization of industry, as in the corporate state. 
~ fuether this tendency will prove to be successful, or not, 
is not the object of this paper to say. But one of the 
important signs points in this direction. 
Because of the great importance of the corpora-
tion in the field of business organization, many 
prominent men have been attracted to the study of this 
subject. As a result there is much material on the sub-
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ject readily available to any interested parties. There 
are a :few important sources used in this paper which merit 
mention at t his time. I. M. Wormser includes several im-
portant chapt ers on the early development of the corpora-
tion in his book entitled "Frankenstein Incorporated". In 
the book entitled "The Early History o:f American 
Corporations" J. s. Davis makes a scholarly and comperhen-
sive treatment of this subject. In regard to the recent 
combination movement, L. H. Haney's "Business Organization 
-
and Combination 11 , and Donaldson 1 s "Business Organization•• 
have proved very useful. The work o:f Jenks and Clark on 
"The Trust Problem" and Bonbright and Means' study o:f "The 
Holding Company" have proved to be very comprehensive and 
valuable in this thesis. 
One o:f the principal points of interest connected 
with the study o:f the corporation in recent times has been 
the concentration of control i n industry afforded by this 
form of organization. In regard to the early development 
of this phenomenon, C. R. Van Rise did some of the pioneer 
work, the results o:f which were published in 1911 in his 
book entitled "6oncentration and Control". He also pre-
-
sents a comprehensive study of the economic causes o:f t he 
concentration movement. One of the most widely known and 
recent books on this subject is "The Modern Corporation 
and Prive.te Property". The statistical analysis o:f the 
concentration of contemporary industry is particula rly 
important. The Twentieth Centur y Fund Committee instituted 
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a more recent study which achieves similar statistical 
results. However, the compilers of this study do not 
feel that the limited data which they have organized jus-
tify such sweeping implications, in regard to the present 
corporate situation, as indicated by Berle and Means. 
Mr. H. w. Laidler has contributed a significant analysis 
of concentration in the various lines of industry. As a 
result of his investigations, the findings of which were 
published in a book called "Concentration of Control in 
American Industry", he believes that the corporate situa-
tion in this country has become so concentrated that 
drastic steps should be taken to protect the rights of 
the public. 
In the field of the social aspect of corporate 
ills and abuses, Professor w. z. Ripley of Harvard has 
made a notable reputation. Particular use has been made 
in this thesis of his work entitled "Main Street and Wall 
Street 11 • Also in connection with this subject much use-
ful information in regard to the legal aspect of the 
corporation in the early years of corporate regulations 
and the present outlook on this situation has been found 
in "Business Organization and Control" by c. s. Tippitts 
and s. Livermore. Of course, in citing the above sources 
of information we must not underestimate the value of the 
other work done in this field, which will be noted in the 
bibliography. Many of these authors have contributed 
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interesting and highly important information which will 
be noted throughout the text in footnotes. 
1. 
Chapter I 
THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORA.TIOl'f 
Ancient Development 
Corporate activity in its simplest form is co-
operative effort for some common goal. All the 
achievements of mankind in the past are due to collective 
action. Man by nature is a social being. Hence we 
find the earl iest evidence of the corporate idea in primi-
tive n~n's conception of the family, clan, and tribe. If 
this conjecture is correct the corporate idea originated 
with no one people but arose in many places due to social 
and economic necess ities and in conjunction with man's 
gregarious instinct. Thus, as human affairs became more 
intricate and complex, the tendency to recognize and per-
mit artificial persons, or corporations, becomes 
prevalent. 
The traders of the eastern Medit erranean, from 
Tyre and Sidon etc., are supposed to have used a primitive 
corporate form in defraying the expenses of the hazardous 
sea voyages wh ich they undertook in their business. The 
first actual intimation of corporate recognition, however, 
seems to have occurred in ancient Greece. According to a 
passage in the Pandects, many bf the corporate regulations 
and provisions in the law of the early Roman Republic seem 
to have been copied from the laws of Solon which 
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recognized private companies. This was in the sixth 
century B. c. The main principle of this Greek code 
was that such companies could exist only if they did not 
interfere with the law or public policy. This has been 
one of the underlying ideas of all corporation law down 
to the present time. 
It is evident that Roman civilization recognized 
corporations from the earliest days of the empire. urt 
was Numa Pompilius (715-672 B.C.)" says Blackstone in his 
commentaries on the authority of Plutarch "who first con-
ceived the notion of incorporation. 11 Pompilius used the 
corporation to end the strife between the Sabines and the 
Romans. Therefore, the two factions were subdivided by 
creating separate collective associations for every dis-
tinct trade, profession, and calling. This practice was 
extended to business organizations even though the Romans 
were not noted for their commercial activities. There 
were several legal principles which were established at 
that time. The most important of these was the indis-
soluble nature of the corporation. The Romans held that 
three members were necessary to form a corporation. This 
is a second principle which is correct corporation law to-
day. But the Romans held that only one member was needed 
to continue in organization after formation. The Roman 
maxim was "Tres Faciunt Collegium11 (three may form a col-
lective group). Consent of the state was necessary to 
form a corporation. Furthermore, the state supervised 
3. 
every step of the formation, management, and dissolution 
of the corporation. This type of organization was en-
dowed with most of the rights of natural persons. They 
could make contracts, take and hold property, ·and liti-
gate. A concept of corporation law which is not now 
valid is that members of the corporation were liable for 
the debts of the organization if it became insolvent. 
Roman law also recognized that the purpose of the corpora-
tion was to provide for some good which would be beneficial 
to the public. Illicit corporations were prosecuted 
vigorously. Thus, Roman law responded to the social and 
economic necessit i es of the time and produced a corporation 
whose legal standing and purpose of service is substantial-
ly the same as it is today. 
Sohm, in his 11 Institutes of Roman Law 11 , says, 
"Roman law contrived to accomplish a veritable masterpiece 
of juristic ingenuity in discovering the notion of a col-
lective person; in clearly grasping and distinguishing from 
its members the collective whole as the ideal unity of the 
members bound together by the corporate constitution; in 
raising this whole to the rank of a person (a juristic per-
son, namely); and in securing it a place in private law as 
an independent subject of proprietary capacity, standing on 
t . th . t 1 the same foo 1ng as o er pr1va e persons. 
1. Wormser, I. M.; "Frankenstein Incorporated", page 6. 
4. 
Medieval Evolution 
After the fall of Rome, corporations were of 
little value for many centuries. According to Blackstone, 
an important commentator on the origins of common law, the 
early development of corporations in England was due to 
the Church. He claims that the Church was the connecting 
link across the· long gap of the middle ages and that she 
handed down to twelfth century England the heritage of an-
cient Rome. But this apparently was only one source from 
which English common law was developed. The reason for 
this was that Roman law was practically unknown in England 
before the Norman Conquest (1066), while corporations 
existed in England long before Roman sources were available. 
The Encyclopedia of the -social sciences states "The 
classic theory is that they originated in England in two 
institutions: the early English borough and association of 
inhabitants joined together for mutual defense and civil 
works; the medieval guilds associations of traders or 
craftsmen organized to forward their interests, to provide 
for need.y members, and in part to control their respective 
trades.~1 It is e~ident, therefore, that the English cor-
-poration in its early development is a product of local 
evolution, with outside influences affecting its later 
1. Means and Berle, · "Encyclopedia of Socie.l Sciences", 
Volume II, page 414. 
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development. 
The influence of the Church was felt in the sub-
sequent development o:f the· corporation in several differ-
ent ways. The Church used the corporate organization :for 
the maintenance o:f discipline and as a meru1s for holding 
church property. In addition to this indirect in:fluence, 
the chancellor's o:f:fice was almost invariably held by an 
ecclesiastic in the early days. The chancellor was in 
charge o:f a court to which all appeals :for extraordinary 
legal redress were re:ferred. Eventually a court o:f 
equity was built up around him, based on principles o:f 
conscience, which :freely applied corporate concepts. Up 
until the time o:f the Re:for.mation in England, the king 
shared the privilege o:f incorporation with the pope, who 
could incorporate ecclesiastical organizations. A:fter 
the Re:for.mation, the king alone had the right to incor-
porate, with certain exceptions. Particular local bodies 
possessed a special license to incorporate. Thus, the 
chancellor o:f the University o:f Oxford had the power to 
create sub-corporations, and actually used this power on 
several occasions. This prerogative of private agencies 
to create :fictitious persons is peculiar to the early 
common law o:f England. 
The feudal lords of the middle ages were jealous 
of the ecclesiastical corporations because of the :finan-
cial returns which they lost. The main objection against 
church corporations was the accumulated wealth which was 
6. 
willed to the Church. Chapter XLIII . of the Magna Charta 
contained a provision which was construed as an absolute 
prohibition of granting lands to religious houses. 1 Thus 
the early laws against "mortmain" pursued this policy and 
extended it to the prohibition of the transferring of any 
lands. Ultimately the tenn 11 mortmain 11 was applied to 
the possession of any lands by corporations, in contrast· 
to human ownership. The Church, in attempting to avoid 
this law, arranged to have its property held in trust by 
laymen. Richard II enlarged the law in such a way as to 
prohibit this. However, this restriction against "mort-
main11 could be circumvented at any time by special license 
from the Crown and later by an act of ~arliament. This 
right was seldom exercised except for some particular 
benefit to the public. 
The early law of wills in England followed out 
this policy of limiting the rights of corporations to re-
ceive property by bequest. VJhen the famous English 
Statute of Wills was passed in 1540, corporations were not 
allowed to acquire property by devise. Prior to this 
statute, there was no legal right in England to devise real 
estate by will. Traces of this ancient fear of "mortmain't 
are still found, not only in the law of England but also 
in many American states. 
1. Wonnser, I. M., 11 Frankenstein Incorporated 11 , page 10. 
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In addition to the ecclesiastical corporation of 
the middle ages, there existed two other distinctly dif-
ferent classes of corporate organization. Neighborhood 
groups were organized into corporations the nature of 
which was municipal. The second class of corporation ·was 
the trade union, or guildated corpo r ation. Both of these 
types of corporations either had charters from the Crown 
or were considered as having a prescriptive right to exist-
ence because of the extraordinary length of the history of 
the organizations. The trade guilds or corporations were 
very powerful at that time. They administered their 
occupation with minute supervision and strength. They 
could make rules and by-laws so long as they were not con-
trary to public policy. The first guild to organize in 
this fashion was the weavers, at about the time of Henry II. 
These early corporations of medieval England were 
of an entirely different type from the modern business cor-
poration. No s t ock was issued, nor was commercial 
exploitation attempted; nor were profits their main object 
in life as in our present corporations. On the 
contrary, the corporation was used to strengthen the 
government's authority in spheres where its influence was 
-
weak. In ventures of foreign trade and exploration, the 
arm of the Crown was fortified according to the incorporat-
ing agreement. It is interesting to note that our own 
federal government makes use of the corporate form to more 
effectively administer the financial commercial affairs 
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which are constantly being included in its jurisdiction. 
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation is a good example 
of present-day governmental usage of the corporation. 
But with the advent of ~ueen Elizabeth in the 
middle of the sixteenth century, a new step in the devel-
opment of the corporation was beginning to take place. 
~ueen Elizabeth had among her abilities foresight as to 
the possibilities of commercial development of that period. 
She encouraged foreign commerce, exploitation, and colon-
ization. It is in this field that the necessity for a 
form of business organization similar to the modern busi-
ness corporat ion became extraordinary. And, as in 
ancient Rome, the law recognized the necessity for corpor-
ate development because of the enlarged business possibili-
ties in foreign trade, exploration, and colonization on a 
large scale under its aegis. 
During the reign of this the last of the Tudors, 
England was successful in war, prosperous in industry, and 
energetic in her colonial expansion. The wool trade was 
being developed by Flemish immigrants. London was growing 
into a big business and trading center. On January 25, 
1571, Elizabeth herself inaugurated the Royal Exchange. 
The most important event of Elizabeth's reign, 
however, to the student of corporate development, was the 
founding, on December 31, 1600, by royal charter, of the 
East India Company. This was not the first corporation 
to be organized for foreign trade but it was the most 
9. 
important up to this time. The Muscovy Company was or-
ganized in ~ueen Mary's time, in 1592, for trade with the 
Near East. These companie s which preceded the East India 
Company came the nearest to approximating such modern 
business giants as the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company or the United States Steel Corporation. The 
East India Company was originally chartered for fifteen 
years and was given a monopoly on trade with the East 
Indies. Later, in 1609, the charter was made perpetual, 
subject to termination only upon proof of injury to the 
state and only at the end of a three-year notice. 
The reason for the development of these big trad-
ing companies was the expense entailed in their operations. 
Ships, seamen, employees, provisions for long voyages, and 
the dangers and perils incident to them were too great an 
expense for any single person or any small group to bear 
alone. Business association of some sort became impera-
tive. "The East India Company itself urged that 'Noblemen, 
gentlemen, shopkeepers, widows and orphans, and all other 
subjects may be true traders and employ their capital in a 
joint stock." 1 This is similar to the appeals of our 
modern business corporation which emphasize that the wealth-
iest as well as the poorest citizen may be interested in 
some giant corporation by the purchase of shareR of stock. 
The history of the East India Company is one of 
1. Wormser, I . M.; "Frankenstein Incorporated", page 16. 
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prosperous deve l opment. Up until 1614 the joint stock 
was subscribed for each voyage. After that, stock was 
subscribed for a number of years. The company estab-
lished a few factories at Bantan in Java, at first. Later 
on, the Dutch were ous ted and developments were carried 
on at Surat on the Gulf of Cambay; at Madras and Bombay 
in India. By the end of the seventeenth century the com-
pany had become quite strong. It maintained fleets and 
armies. It owned vast territories and g overned many 
peoples. This was the beginning of modern dollar diplomacy 
in the English speaking world . 
The theory of corporate organizati on had been 
developed from a mere joint venture with stock subscribed 
for each voyage to a point where the company had continu-
ous success:ijon. Shares of stock in the company were 
freely transferable, and liability was limited to the 
amount of stock owned by an individual member. "It had 
a large capital stock and surplus and possessed practical-
ly every attribute of the modern corporation. So 
prosperous was the company at this time that it was able 
to lend the English government 3,190,000 pounds at the low 
rate of 3t1o interest in 1709. The company kept books of 
transfer of the stock almost from the beginning. One of 
the earliest rights of the share-holder was to have his 
name inscribed in the stock book of the company. 111 
1. Wormser, I. M.; 11 Frankenstein Incorporated", page 17. 
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Charles the Second was keenly aware of the advan-
tages to be secured from foreign trade, and he encouraged 
the English merchants to engage in it. Indeed, it may be 
said that the beginning of the CO:t11t11ercial wars which we 
know today was during his reign. The part played by the 
giant corporations in this connection is quite prominent. 
These giant corporations were not considered ordinary busi-
nesses for the every-day pursuit of business. They were 
considered to be performing important public functions and 
hence were a sort of subdivision of the state itself, to 
which had been assigned the duty of prosecuting foreign 
trade. Their relation to the state was comparable to the 
municipal and guildated corporations of an earlier period 
which had performed services for the state. In the first 
English book on corporations, which was published anony-
mously, it is stated that 11 The general intent and end of 
all civil corporations i~ for better government, either 
general or special." 
The use of the corporation became very popular as 
a form of organization at the close of the seventeenth cen-
tury. The Bank of England was incorporated July 27, 1694. 
This gave financial as well as political support to King 
William. Prosperity occurred in the early eighteenth cen-
tury in England, and with it came a period of frenzied 
finance~ Many of the financial practices of our day were 
engaged in by business men. Speculation, stock joQbing, 
watering of stock, and swindling were prevalent. Shares 
12. 
of the South Sea Stock Company soared in value from 100 
pounds to 1000 pounds almost overnight. Inevitably, the 
period of reaction set in with all the modern customs of 
exposure and suicide. Many of these failures were not 
properly incorporated stock companies but merely joint 
stock companies. Nevertheless, people distrusted any 
type of business enterprise, much as people have lost con-
fidence today. 
However, this early depression did not last long 
and eventually business prospered again. But the real 
basis of the modern business cycle was just beginning. The 
industrial revolution, with all its economic problems and 
readjustments,was just commencing. Production was boom-
ing and employment was decreasing, due to technological 
inventions and improvements. But all the new companies 
which sprang up at this time, including banks, water works, 
canal operators, manufacturers, and railroads, sought in-
corporate charters. And so it is to be noted that it was 
at this time that the real law of English corporations not 
connected with the state began to be formulated. Thus 
"There is to be noted a complete change in the general na-
ture and conception of a corporation from an institution 
for the special government of a neighborhood or trade, 
whether domestic or foreign, into a business agency and 
instrumentality for the handling of large industrial, manu-
facturing, banking, and similar enterprises necessitating 
the association together of large amounts of capital."l 
1. Wormser, I. M.; "Frankenstein Incorporated 11 , page 25. 
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Until the year 1862 the privilege of incorpora-
tion was permitted only by specific act of the Crown or 
of Parliament . But by the Companies Act of 1862 the 
privilege of incorporation was thrown open to everyone 
on the same terms or conditions, thus doing away with 
favoritism and corruption which characterized the old sys-
tern of incorporqtion. The English, in passing such an 
act, merely followed the lead of many American states 
which had passed similar laws previously. The "Companies 
Act was passed again in 1908 with certain modifications 
and amendments. This act furnished a simple and inexpen-
sive method of incorporation. 111 The notation of 
incorporation required the signatures of seven subscribers 
to the stock. This notation, on payment of a small fee, 
could be registered and a certificate of incorporation 
would be issued. The English corporation is unique in 
that it forces all corporations to include the .word 
"Limited" as the last word of the title of the organization. 
The purpose of this word is to notify all possible credi-
tors that the subscribers are not personally liable for the 
obligations of the corporation outside of their original 
capital contribution. In all the memoranda of association 
a clause is inserted to the effect that the liabilities of 
the subscribers are limited. 
The continental aspect of commercial combinations 
1. Wormser, I. M.; "Frankenstein Incorporated", page 16. 
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is a subject in itself. Generally speaking, however, the 
independent competitive spirit of English common law 
treatment of the corporation is absent. International 
monopolistic cartels have sprung up all over the continent. 
Sometimes the government has taken over monopolistic com-
binations and administered them for revenue purposes. But 
the principal point of interest to the student of the 
corporation is the viewpoint from which the legal entity 
of the corporation is judged on the continent. According 
to the "Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences", continental 
law found the entity not in the legal for.m but in the enter-
prise. Thus, although the legal society may be reformed or 
entirely broken up, as by bankruptcy, the entity may persist 
where there is a defined enterprise which continues in 
existence. This is now well known to American law but not 
recognized by it. 
Early Colonial History in the United States 
The transposition of the corporate form of organ-
ization to the New World seems natural enough because of 
the fact that the earliest development of the American 
continent v1as due to the corporate form of organization. 
E. P. Cheyney says "The wh.ole advance of English discovery, 
co1mnerce, and colonization in the sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries was due not to individuals but.to the 
efforts of corporate bodies." 1 Descendants of the English 
1. Davis, J". '€.; "The Early-·History of American Corpora-
tions", Vol. I, page 4. 
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naturally followed the type of organization used in the 
mother country and which helped to develop their own 
country. 
Early in the history of the colonies, the gover-
nors and assemblies issued corporate charters. Such 
power was not specifically provided for but the power was 
theoretically obtained by delegation from the Crown. In 
most of the royal colonies the governors had the right of 
incorporation. The power of incorporation was disputed 
in the chartered colonies in spite of the fact that the 
assemblies claimed the power. In response to the inquiry 
of Thomas Hutchinson, Governor of Massachusetts 1771-1772, 
in regard to his power of incorporation without the assent 
of the assembly, the Solicitor of the Colonies, Richard 
Jackson, remarked that in that colony "the governor, though 
appointed by His Majesty, nevertheless derives his powers 
immediately from the charter which in many respects quali-
fies the power usually intrusted to His Majesty's governors 
. 1 
in other colonies." The power of the assembly to incor-
porate.was subject to gubernatorial veto. In the royal 
colonies, however, the governor usually had the power to 
incorporate as distinguished from the chartered colo-
nies' pm7er to perform the function. 
Before the Revolutiibnary War, corporations were 
seldom to be found in the New Wo ld. "Chief Justice Baldwin 
1. Davis, J. S.; "The Early Hist ory of American Corpora-
tions", Volume I, page 28. 
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of Connecticut asserts that dur ing the colonial period of 
American history there were only six native-born corpora-
tions." The reasons for this were twofold: first, an 
inherited distrust and fear of the gigantic monopolistic 
trading companies such as the East India Company. The 
second reason was to be found in the fac t that all corpora-
tions usually had monopolistic tendencies. Furthermore, 
the economic conditions necessary for the development of 
corporations were lacking in the early days of the colonies. 
The colonists were too busy farmi ng, clearing the wilder-
ness, and performing the other t asks required in an 
agricultural civ i lization. 
The early American atti tude towards corporations 
was similar to that of all gove nments and peoples down to 
that time. The corporation up until that time had as its 
purpose semi-public tasks and duties, such as canal, 
bridge, and turnpike companies. The corporation would 
never have come into existence except for the services 
which it rendered to the public. ·. This attitude was about 
to evolve into the laissez-faire methods of incorporation 
of the modern business organization. However, according 
to L. H. Haney, the first corporation to be organized in 
the New World under a legislative charter for profit was 
the "New London Society United for Trade and Commerce in 
Connecticut". Th is charter was repealed a year later be-
cause of the disastrous results of an issue of currency by 
a bank established under the charter. 
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The next step in the evolution of the corporation 
in the New Vorld was concerned with the question of 
whether the central government should have the power of in-
corporation. The states were loath to give the central 
government the right to incorporate. The power was final-
ly granted under the Articles of Confederation. But when 
Congress later tried to incorporate the First Bank of North 
America under the present constitution, the opposition was 
such that it seemed evident that the power of chartering 
would be limited greatly because of the jealousy of the 
state governments. The Bank of North America now operates 
under a charter granted it by the state of Pennsylvania 
when i'h.s federal charter expired and was not renewed. 
After the Revolutionary War the number of corpora-
tions increased more rapidly in the New World. Public 
disfavor gradually disappeared. According to L. H. Haney, 
in his book entitled "Business Organization and Combination", 
uthis came about because of the growth of industry and part-
ly because of the rise of an invest i ng class".1 · Another 
cause of the increase in corporations was the gradual 
elimination of the previously inherent monopolistic nature 
of this type of organization. The rugged individualism of 
a young and growing country would not permit the stifling 
of individual initiative by monopolies. 
The principle of free and equal incorporation 
1. Haney, L. H.; "Business Organization and Combination", 
revised edition of 1914, page 103. 
I 
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under general laws and open to all citizens was another 
reason for the growth of the corporate for.m of organiza-
tion• _ This principle is very important in the growth o~ 
business, as well as corporations, in America. The 
ree_sons for general laws for incorporation were numerous. 
The first of these was the clash of private interests in 
the legislature, where bribery and "pull" could be made to 
count. Secondly, with numerous groups desirous o~ 
organizing, the legislatures would not have enough time to 
investigate them all. The lack of cont i nuity in legisla-
tive sessions prevented any organizing during adjournment. 
JPinally, the laissez-faire theory in the management of 
industry tended to minimize state interference in indus-
trial affairs. 
North Carolina pioneered the principle of free 
incorporation in a statute enacted in 1795, which at that 
time was limited to canal companies but which was later 
extended to all types of companies. This development of 
the principle of free incorporation was compatible with 
the opinion of the American court that corporations held 
only such powers as were expressly granted in their char-
ters or were reasonably incident to them. The English 
legal opinion that a corporation had the right to do any-
thing which a natural person might do was rebuked by the 
American court • 
The economic reason for the increase in corpora-
tion growth was undoubtedly the fundamental and most 
19. 
powerful one. The Industrial Revolution was under vre.y. 
Manufacturers were developing, not only in England but 
also in this country. Whitney's cotton gin and Slater's 
cotton factory were the foren1nners of a tremendous in-
dustrial development. There was a significant increase 
in banking facilities and business in general as a result 
of the embargo of the War of 1812. Much of this develop-
ment took place in New England because of the valuable and 
abundant water power. 
In addition to this manufacturing development, 
the decade 1820-1830 saw the opening up of the Weit as a 
result of advances in the field of transportation. Immi-
gration increased because of the demand for labor. The 
Erie Canal was completed, and work was started on the 
Baltimore and Ohi o Railroad. The purpose of this railroad 
was to divert some of the western trade from New York City. 
The railroad was successful, and others were built. And 
in this way a market was d.eveloped for the mass production 
industries. A tremendous amount of capital was required 
for this development. And, again, the benefits of corpor-
ate organization, which drew wealth from many sources'- . . 
returned benefits to the people of the country as a whole 
and to the subscribers in particular. 
From the beginning of the industrialization of the 
United States down to the present time the story of the 
growth of the corporation has been the story of the growth 
of American industry. The consolidation of the railroads, 
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the development of steamship travel, and the expansion of 
con~unication facilities demanded cooperation on a gigan-
tic scale. I. M. VJormser explains this inter-relation 
between industry and its form of organization by saying 
"The law, always, responds, though slowly, to social and 
economic dem.a:nds, and by the year 1875 the modern American 
law of corporations was well under way. nl 
We have seen the history of the corporation from 
its early indistinct fo1~ in Greece. The legal mind of 
the Romans defined the status of the corporation and they 
used it to carry on the commerce of their huge empire. 
Corporation evolution lagged along with commercial depres-
sion during the middle ages. However, from the time of 
the English trading companies of the seventeenth century 
down to the present, the develppment of the corporation has 
continued without a halt. Until today we find it of such 
importance that the government's indifference is being re-
-placed by a keener desire to supervise and regulate the 
affairs of corporations. 
-4-
1. Wormser, I. M.; "Frankenstein Incorporated", page 48. 
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Chapter II 
THE CORPORATION AND Trill MODERN CO~ffiiNATION MOVEMENT 
Gentlemen's Agreements 
The second signiricant step in the growth of the 
corporation has to do with the modern combination move-
ment. The combination movement began in the early 1870's 
and has continued up to the present time. This movement 
has taken several different forms based on the corporate 
principle and has progressed with various rates of speed, 
depending on economic conditions. The important princi-
ple to understand in this connection is that without the 
corporation the growth of "Big Business" would have been 
almost impossible. L. H. Haney states that 11 Last, but by 
no means least, the development of corporate organization 
was itself a factor in facilitating combination."1 It is 
interesting to note that it is this characteristic of con-
centration which is still prominent today. 
There were a number of causes which were 
responsible for the combination movement. The essential 
cause is to be found in the increase of competition brought 
about by the overexpansion of large-scale enterprises. 
Some method of restricting production and regulating prices 
had to be found. Secondly, the increase of overhead costs 
of the large-scale production industries required a con-
stant ~fttflow of goods from the factories, for whatever 
1. Haney, L. H.; "Business Organization and Combination .. , 
page 138. 
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price they would bring, to meet these costs. The factor 
of personal ambition must not be omitted in considering 
the captains of industry behind the formation of many of 
the big combinations. All these fac t ors, which will be 
noted more fully in a following section, were prominent 
forces behind the combination movement. The modern 
development of the corporation as an instrument of business 
concentration is inextricably intenvoven with the modern 
combination movement. The modern corporation lends itself 
more easily to the development of giant combinations than 
any of the common law for.ms of organization, such as the 
individual proprietorships and the partnership. The rea-
son for this is twofold. The first reason is financial. 
The corporation has possibilities of almost limitless fi-
nancial expansion. Thus, it is necessary only to combine 
a few large corporations to develop a giant combination. 
Secondly, control of a corporation can change hands by the 
purchase of a ma j ority of the voting stock, without dis-
rupting the organization. But in the case of other 
organizations, dissolution and disruption usually follow. 
It is thus apparent that, as regards its form, the corpora-
tion is ideally suitable as an instrument of combination~ 
And without the corporation the progress of giant business 
combination would have been much more difficult, if not 
impossible. 
The first period of the combination movement began 
shortly after the close of the Civil War and extended up to 
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1890. Combination of joint stock companies occurred 
severa l hundred years prior to this, i n England. Adam 
Smith, in his much quoted saying from 11 The Wealth of' Na-
tions" published in 1776, said 11 People of the same trade 
seldom meet together :for merriment and diversion but that 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public 
or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible 
indeed to prevent such meetings by any law which either 
could be execut ed, or would be consistent with liberty and 
.justice. 111 Many industries prior to the Civil War had 
undergone a limited expansion, but these industrial com-
panies had not reached the stage where they were combined 
with one another. 
But this early expansion was the stage setting 
required :for t h e post Civil War combination movement. The 
:first type of combination used in the primitive combination 
period af'ter the Civ i l War was the gentlemen's agreement. 
Thi s was an oral agreement made by directors of a number of' 
companies in a similar line of business for the purpose of' 
maintaining prices, restricting product ion, dividing the 
mErket, or in connection with some other policy. Since 
they were only informal understandings, they constituted a 
weak and decentralized form of combination. The gentle-
men's agreement was not a permanent form of combination. No 
penalties were established for companies that broke the 
1. Smith, Adam; "The Wealth of Nations 11 , Book I, Chapt. 10, 
page 116. 
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agreement. All participants were on their "honor" to 
carry out the terms of the agreement. If penalties had 
been attached to the agreement, no court would have en-
forced them for t hey were in restraint of trade and con-
trary to public policy. It is evident for this reason 
that they were secret agreements. 
The gent l emen's agreement was the main type of 
.. 
combination in vogue from the close of the Civil War to 
1875. This is mainly because of the f act that the system 
of combination was slowly evolving and no other method had 
been developed up to this time for obtaining the benefits 
of combination. This type of agreement has been used, 
ever since its inception, in varying degrees down to the 
present time. And there are undoubtedly many in existence 
today, though it is difficult to determine the extent of· 
their use because of the secrecy that surrounds them. 
"The most famous of the gentlemen's agreements was 
heralded by the 'Gary dinners 1 ."1 The steel business had 
overexpanded for some years previous to t his time. Because 
of the large overhead in this business, when ~epression came 
the companies were prone to cut prices. It was feared 
during the panic of 1907 that price-cutting would follow in 
this line. So Judge E. H. Gary, Chairman of the United 
States Steel Company, invited executives representing 90~ 
of the steel industry to a dinner held November 20, 1907. 
1. Donaldson, E. F.; "Business Organization and Procedure", 
page 414. 
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These dinners were held periodically thereafter until 
1911, when they were discontinued because of the fear of 
unfavorable publicity. Such publicity might result in 
prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. The pur-
pose of these dinners was to make the various companies 
maintain certain, agreed upon, prices for their products. 
It was explained that the whole steel industry was 
operating below its capacity output and that the individual 
companies should, therefore, be content to operate at near 
capacity and not attempt to increase their market by price-
cutting, because this practice would not increase the 
market materially. If prices were cut, however, the 
other companies would have to follow, with the consequence 
the diminution of profits for all the companies concerned. 
Judge Gary stated the policy of the United States Steel 
Company at these dinners. The other executives would then 
state their policies. These were supposed to be freely 
arrived at, but usually they agreed with Judge Gary's 
policy. These agreements usually included restriction of 
production, because without this price agreements were 
usually unsuccessful. 
The division of the market was another purpose for 
which the gentlemen's agreement was used. The market was 
in most cases divided with regard to territory or products. 
Competing companies agreed to sell their products only 
within certain predetermined areas. Ever since the disso-
lution of the Standard Oil Trust in 1911, at which time the 
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subsidiaries divided the country into territories allotting 
to each subsidiary a particular territory, the Standard Oil 
subsidiaries have stayed out of each other's territory. 
'When agreements dividing the market become complex, they 
are termed pools, and will be discussed later. 
The s i mplicity of gentlemen's agreements was, at 
the sruae time, their main advantage and disadvantage. No 
formality is required for their formation. Each member 
is left at liberty to operate his own company as he sees 
fit. The purpose of the a greements is chiefly to avoid 
price-cutting the main objectionable feature of rugged 
competition. The ease with which the members may with-
draw from the agreement is one of the principal disadvan-
tages. The lack of centralized control and the illegality 
preclude any attempt at enforcing the agreements. No 
economy of operation was obtained, as in later methods of 
combination. The consuming public is usually adversely 
affected by them because of the price-raising agreements. 
According to Professor E. F. Donaldson, the term "gentle-
men's agreement" is a misnomer. He states caustically: 
"In the first place it is questionable whether gentlemen 
would enter into such agreements, and in the second place 
if they did make such agreements it is probable they would 
not break them so readily as did the members of the 
'gentlemen's agr eements'."l 
1~ Donaldson, E. F., "Business Organization and Procedure .. , 
page 414. 
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Pools 
The next step in the development of the modern 
corporate combinat ion movement was the pool. The disad-
vantages and weaknesses of the gentlemen's agreements 
offered an important i n centive for the development of the 
pool. Chronologically, the pool originated in the 1880's 
and maintained its prominence till the late nineties. 
Although more permanent and effective methods of control 
and combination originated in the nineties, when the pool 
became less popular, nevertheless the pool has continued 
down to the present time as a form of business organization. 
Pools, similar to gentlemen's agreements, are 
based on agreements. But they are usually reduced to 
writing and include penalties for the violation of the 
contract. The difference between pools and gentlemen's 
agreements is, however, hardly distinguishable. The cause 
of the pools is to be found in the peri ods of severe com-
petition, when companies in industries which have many 
fixed overhead charges are prone to gather together to 
protect themselves from sharp price reduction. Pools 
have been formed for a number of reasons. None of these 
are alike, for they are formed to meet the diverse condi-
tions which each particular industry has to face. The 
usual classification of the different types is as follows: 
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1. Price and Profit Pools 
2. OUtput Pools 
3. Market or Territor ial Pools 
4 . Joint Sales Agency Pools 
5. Patent Pools 
6. Webb Export Association 
{1)(3) Price pools are similar to gentlemen's 
agreements for price mai ntenance, except that they are 
more complex and more formal. The Addyson Pipe Pool, 
formed in 1894, is a good example of the price and profit 
pool as well as the territorial. The Addyson Pipe and 
Steel Company and five other manufacturers of iron pipe 
formed The Associated Pipe 1f orks. These six companies: 
controlled two-thirds of the manufactureipipe output of 
their section of the country. All the territory was di-
vided as to (l)reserve cities, (2)fre e cities, (3) pay 
territory. In the res erve cities only, t he one company 
which was assigned to i t could operate. In the free 
cities, all the companies could compete as if no pool 
existed. In t he pay territory, all contracts were sub-
mit ted to a board representing the six companies. This 
board decided what the charge for the contract would be. 
The board then submitted the contract t o the six companies 
to determine the bonus which each company would pay for 
the contract. The highest bidder of the associated com-
panies won the contract. This so-call ed bonus money was 
then divided among the six companies according to the 
tonnage produced by their plants. 
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(2) The output, or traffic, pool is usually 
fo~1ed for the purpose of limiting the production of a 
certain product and d i viding the total output into pro-
portionate quotas for the different members of the pool. 
Members who exceed their allotment are frequently 
assessed a fine, which may vary with the amount they have 
overrun their quota. Many of these pools fix prices for 
the products they sell. The Whiskey Pool was formed in 
1881 because of the overexpansion of the industry which 
was expecting an abortive tax on liquors. The distillers 
were to pay a certain percentage assessment on the amount 
of grain used. These assessments were used to defray the 
losses of the export trade which was necessary to relieve 
the domestic market. Penalties were set up for the viola-
tion of the agreement. This Whiskey Pool developed into 
the Whiskey Trust in 1887. 
(4) The Joint Sales Pool occurs when several pro-
ducing companies pool their products in one agency for 
sales purposes. The Mi chigan Salt Association, formed in 
1876, is one of the early successful pools of the joint 
sales agency type. Price maintenance and cooperative sales 
agency were the featu res of the first five-year agreement, 
which was late r renewed for twenty-five years. According 
to the agreement, all salt produced was to be delivered to 
the incorporated association for sales purposes. Rest ric-
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tion on production was not imposed because of the high 
fix ed charges and low operating expenses. Marketing 
costs were reduced and the quality of the salt improved. 
And, although price-cutting was prevented, the general 
price of salt decl i ned because of the suscess of this as-
sociation. .A New York firm attempted to control the 
entire industry of the country. Th i s company advanced 
prices, with the consequence an inc r ease in production and 
eventual break in the price which ended the monopoly. 
{5) Patent Pools consist of agreements among a 
number of companies for the interchange of patent rights. 
The making of one article may invo l ve patents belonging to 
a number of individuals. These patents in themselves may 
be worthless, but together they may result in an article 
valuable to the manufacturer and beneficial to the public. 
Most of the previously mentioned pool s are considered to 
be illegal, but the patent pool may b e legal or illegal de-
pending on the circumstances present in the particular case. 
Several different methods may be followed in the establish-
ment of a patent pool. The companies may transfer the 
title of the patent to a trustee, who in turn gives licenses 
to other members of the pool to use the patent. A corpora-
tion may be used instead of t h e trustee device to hold and 
regulate the use of the patent. Occasionally the company 
that owns the patent will lease it on a royalty basis. This 
is the procedure of the Radio Corporation of America, which, 
it is claimed, maintains a virtual monopoly on patents for 
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radio devices. 
'{'a} The Webb Export As s ociat i ons are legal com-
binations for the sole purpose of engaging in foreign 
trade. Ame r ican exporters were at a disadvantage because 
of the Sherman and Cl ayton Anti-Trust actswhen competing 
with large European combinations and cartels in the foreign 
market. Realizing this, the Webb-Pomerene Act was passed 
by Congress in 1918. The purpose of this act was to 
exempt corporations engaging solely in foreign trade from 
the restrictions of the Sherman and Clayton acts. The 
pools formed were similar, in one or more respects, to 
those already mentioned, such as the price fixing, the out-
put restriction, or sales agency type. This act has been 
of value to America n business, particularly the smaller 
· companies which are not able to maintain sales agencies 
abroad. 
The pool, as might be expected of any early devel-
opment in the field of combination, had more weaknesses 
than strong points to recormnend it. Combinations, because 
of the large-scale production, often pass on the savings to 
the conslliner, but this rarely happens in the case of pools. 
Operating costs were not reduced, and prices were usually 
increased. Secret illegal agreements are not conducive to 
the development of good business ethics. It is interest-
ing to note that both the Emergency Railroad and Transpor-
tation Act and the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
legalized certain types of pooling agreements. These were 
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not the old secret types of pools but were openly arrived 
at, cooperative agreements, under governmental supervision. 
The Combination Type Trust 
As was seen in the previous section on gentlemen's 
agreements and pools, these types of combinations were not 
completely satisfactory because of their lack of centraliz-
ed control and because of the inability to enforce the 
agreements. Big business was beginning to grow, and all 
its ingenuity was applied to the development of new and 
more efficient forms of organization. Combination, as we 
have seen, was necessary to obviate the wastes of unregu-
lated competition and over-production. The next form of 
combination to be developed was the "Trust". This type o:f 
organization is of mostly historical importance today, be-
cause it has been declared illegal in most jurisdictions in 
this country. 
The term "trust" is apt to be confusing to the lay-
man. The simple trust is an old common law relationship. 
The legal title of property is transferred to an outsider, 
who is known as the trustee. The trustee controls the pro-
perty for the benefit of the original owner or his designate. 
In this way the legal title is in the name of an outsider, 
while the beneficial title remains in the name of the 
original owner or the person selected by him. This type of 
trust has been encouraged in Massachusetts to such an extent 
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that corporations often use this form to hold real estate 
and thus avoid the old common law "mortmain" restrictions 
on real estate. 
There are two other types of organization of a 
fiduciary nature which should be distinguished from the 
combination type trust. These are t h e investment trust 
and the voting trust, both of which will be treated more 
fully in the following chapters. The investment trust is 
an institution which solicits surplus investable funds 
from many different people for the purpose of investing in 
a diversified selection of securities, in order to lessen 
the individual risk. The voting trust is a method where-
by voting stock owners submit their stock to some organized 
group for the purpose of voting all the stock so submitted 
as a unit. The dividends and ownership of the stock are 
retained by the original owner. Frequently this device is 
used to protect the minority interest. 
To describe all the character i stics of the combina-
tion type trust in a brief definition i s difficult. 
Professor Haney suggests the following definition: "A form 
of business organization established through temporary con-
solidation, in which the stock holders of the constituent 
orgru~izations under a trust agreement transfer a controlling 
amount of their stock to a board of trustees in exchange for 
trust certificates. These certificates show their equitable 
interest in the income of the combination."1 The following 
1. Haney, L. H.; "Business Organization and Combination 11 , 
pages 193, 194. 
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illustration will help to convey a clearer picture of the 
trust organization. 
In studying this type of trust , we shall take as 
our example the Standard Oil Trust because it was the first 
of its kind and it served as a model for other trusts. The 
Standard Oil Company made its first trust agreement in 1879 
but it was revised in 1882. The explanation that follows 
refers to the second agreement. This trust was composed 
of forty companies - some were corporations, others were 
partnerships and f orty-six individuals. Stock in 
these forty companies was exchanged pro rata for trust cer-
tificates of $100 par value. This stock was held by nine 
trustees who controlled the activities of the different 
companies. The trustees were elected for a term of three 
years, and their tenns were so arranged that only three va-
cancies would occur at each annual meeting. In this way 
the original trustees could maintain control as long as the 
trust existed. The trust could continue in operation until 
twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of the 
original nine trustees. 
The stock transferred to the trustees was likewise 
trru1sferred to them on the books of the various corporations. 
The trust certificates were transferrable in the market in 
the same way that shares of stock are. The holders of trust 
certificates were entitled to one vote, either in person or 
by proxy. They could not vote on the directors of the cor-
poration or on other matters which ordinarily c~~e before the 
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stockholders. These privileges were delegated to the 
holders of the stock or the trustees. The certificate 
holders could vote only on the election of trustees~ The 
trustees held a unique position in the Standard Oil Trust. 
They were majority stock holders in the various companies 
before the formation of the combination. Hence, they had 
a majority of the trust certificates, each of which was 
allowed one vote. In this way, the trustees could not 
only control the various companies in the trust but also 
they could cont rol their own positions. By the control 
of directors in the various companies, the trustees indi-
rectly control l ed the declaration of d i vidends. The 
trustees had authority to use the dividende to acquire 
stock in other companies. During the ten-year life of 
the trust they purchase•i stocks of 78 additional companies. 
The Standard Oil Trust attained a. marked success 
in its field. It controlled about 90~ of the oil refining 
capacity and pipe lines in the country~ 11 During the ten 
year period of its life, the value of t he property was in-
creased from $75,000,000 to $121,000,000." 1 It was able to 
declare large dividends and still re-invest a large amount 
in the business. The Standard Oil Trust had a. virtual 
monopoly on the oil refining business of the country. There 
were two reasons for this. Primarily because of the large 
amount of capital needed for such a business. And secondly, 
a fear of entering a field where such a large combine as the 
1. Donaldson, E. F.; "Business Organization and Procedure", 
page 438. 
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"Standard Oil" would use almost any method to run competi-
tors out of business. 
The policies of the Standard Oil Company, both 
before the organization of the "trust" and afterwards, 
caused much public disapproval. In 1890 the attorney 
general of the state of Ohio started suit against the 
Standard Oil Company of Ohio. Two years afterward, the 
supreme court of Ohio held that the trust was illegal and 
must be dissolved, the trustees divesting themselves of 
the stock of the company. But inasmueh as the majority 
of the stock was held by the nine trus t ees, the control of 
the various companies remained in the hands of the nine 
trustees, individually but not as a board. Eventually, 
in 1899, the Standard Oil Company became a holding company 
under the laws of the State of New 3ersey. 
In addition to the Standard Oil Trust, a nurnber 
of other companies founcl this form of combination suitable 
to the development of bigger business units. Among these 
were the Cottonseed Oil Trust { 1884), IJinseed Oill Trust 
(1885), the 'Nhiskey Trm~t (1887), the Sugar Trust {1887), 
the National Lead Trust (1887). Most of these were short 
lived, for the trust fOlin was condemned in most jurisdic-
tions about 1890. 
There were two reasons why the trusts were illegal: 
namely, that the corporations were without power or author-
ity to enter into trust agreements, and, secondly, that many 
of the trusts constituted a monopoly which is against public 
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policy and therefore illegal. In regard to the lack of 
authority to enter into the trust agreement, corporations 
were regarded by the law as legal entities to be run by 
the properly elected officers and directors. But they 
did not have power to enter into partnerships. Now, the 
law regarded trusts as partnerships composed of a number 
of corporations. In this way, corporations forming 
trusts were considered to have acted ultra vires. Fur-
thermore, the corporations were control led by the trustees 
and not by the proper officers as prov i ded by law. It 
made little difference whether the stockholders or the 
trustees managed the trust; the partnership form is illegal 
for the corporate entity. In addition to this, the courts 
intimated that the trust was illeggl because it was monopol-
istic. The trust controlled a major part of the production 
in its field, and hence it could fix prices. Such combina-
tions were against public policy and were illegal at common 
law. 
In spite of the legal difficu ties to which the 
trusts were subject, they were of considerable value to the 
member companies and were, in most cases, highly successful. 
They had pern1anence and stability, two qualities which were 
lacking in the earliest forms of combination such as the 
11 gentlemen 1 s agreement 11 and the pool. Furthermore, they 
possessed centralized control, an asset necessary to the 
smooth running of any large combination. This resulted in 
many economies to be found in large-scale produdtion. New 
38. 
plans could be developed and tested, and if successful in 
one plant coul d be adopted by the others. Purchasing and 
selling could be done :more economical l y, and better all 
arotmd management was provided. The object of the trusts 
was to control production and, therefore, prices. This 
occurred in most instances, but seldom was a monopoly creat-
ed. Hence there was always a limitation on prices, a 
result of the competition of independents. 
It is generally conceded that society has benefited 
from large-scale production through lower prices and improv-
ed products. But, although trusts pioneered these advances 
they seldom passed these advantages on to the consumer. As 
a matter of fact, in most cases the trust raised the prices 
and passed the savings on to the investors. Without state 
control the monopoly condition effected. by the trusts would 
have been more detrimental to the consumer than free compe-
tition. And in those times there was little, if any, state 
control of "Big Business". 
Oomrnuni ty of Interest 
Vlhen the Standard Oil Trust was dissolved in 1890, 
there was a period of about four or five years during which 
the former trustees ran the companies as individual majority 
stockholders. Because there was a certain unity of control 
over the various companies, the term "community of interest" 
has been applied to that form of organization. According 
39. 
to Professor L. H. Haney, "Community of interest may be 
defined as a form of business organization in which, with-
out any formal central administration, the business policy 
of several companies is controlled by a group of common 
stockholders or directors."1 Usually a majority of stock 
in each company which is to be controlled is required for 
that purpose. But in many instances, due to the wide-
spread ownership of much less than a majority of the stock, 
control is exercised by the appointment of the same 
directors to the different companies. As a device for 
combination, it is similar to the holding company, except 
that a majority of the stock is held by a small group of 
individuals instead of by the holding company. If the 
group acts with concentrated force, c m1trol may be as ef-
fective as in the case of the holding company. This type 
of organization can best be illustrated by an example from 
the banking world. According to Professor Donaldson, 
"The Congressional Committee's (commonly called the Pujo 
Comrnittee) report showed that in 1912,. eighteen large fi-
nancial inst±tt.l.tions in New York and BClston held 746 
directorships in 133 corporations which had a total re-
sources of $25,325,000 1 000." 2 Professor Haney says, of 
the community of interest, "It affords an opportunity for 
devious methods and powers without responsibility, as indi-
cated by its abuse at the hands of the Standard Oil Trust. 
1. Haney, L. H.; "Business Organization and Combinati&n", 
page 207. 
2. Donaldson, E. F.; 11 Business Organization and Procedure", 
pages 480, 481. 
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It there became a trust in disguise. The system of' 
'interlocking' directorates, of' wh ich this is one phase, 
has been one of the most difficult aspects of' the combina-
tion movement to handle. 111 
The community of interest accomplishes some of 
the advantages of' combination without going to the trouble 
of' making any formal ar~angements as i n the case of a 
trust or the holding companies. This type of combination 
lacks centralized control and permanen cy. It usually does 
not obtain the advant age of large-scale production. There 
is no way of enforcing policies, and the general organiza-
tion is of such a loose nature that a conflict among the 
different companies in the combination may arise at any 
time. The community of interest frequently is carried on 
so quietly that many devious and illegal policies may be 
pursued without interruption. 
The Holding Company 
The holding co:11pany was the next development in the 
field of' corporate combination. According ·to Professor 
Donaldson, 11 The holding company is one of the most effective 
devices that has ever been invented for the combination of 
corporations ." 2 This t ype of organization is prominent in 
all fie-lds of industry, and particularly so in the field of 
1. Haney, L. H.; "Business Organization and Combination", 
pages 211 and 212. 
2~ Donaldson, E. F.; ''Business Organization and Procedure", 
page 444. 
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public utilities. The growth of our present "Business 
Giants" has depended a great deal on this important inst ru-
mentality for combining corporations. By the use of the 
holding company it is possible to pyramid corporation upon 
corporation until a single company can control hundreds of 
other companies with assets of billions of dollars. 
The holding company is a corporation formed for 
the purpose of holding stocks of other companies. It does 
not hold the stock for the benefit of others, as in trusts, 
but it actually owns t he stocks of the operating companies. 
There are two types of holding companies, namely the 
operating holding company, or parent company, and the pure 
holding company. The latter type of organization devotes 
itself exclusively to stock ownersl1ip and control of its 
subsidiaries. In the case of the operating holding company, 
the company pursues the production of some utility or object 
as well as holding stocks of subsidiari es. The first type 
of organization would show on its books not only the stocks 
in subsidiary companies but also the fixed assets necessary 
to the pursuit of its original business; whereas, in the see-
ond.;. or 11 pure" type of ltolding company, there would be only 
the owned stocks on the asset side of the balance sheet. 
There are two types of companies which, in some res-
pects, are similar to the holding companies but are essential-
ly different from the holding company. The first of these 
is the 11 investment trust 11 • The investment trust is 
sometimes organized · as a corporation and sometimes as a 
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Massachusetts trust. It is similar to a holding company 
in that it purchases securities in oth er corporations. 
But the object of this type of company is investment and 
not control. As a result, investment trusts usually di-
versify their holdings in various branches of industry, 
while holding companies concentrate on securities in the 
srune line of industries. It is interesting to note in 
t h is connection that the investment trust of late has been 
used for control purposes. Naturally, investment trusts 
desire to have some influence in the affairs of the com-
panies in which it invests. But frequently the desire 
goes beyond this protective interest. Professor Hoagland 
states, in this regard, 11 In other cases, so-called invest-
ment trusts exh ibit all tl1e attributes of holding companies. 
The managers use the funds contributed by the stockholders 
and bondholders to acquire controlling interests in related 
corporations." 1 
The finance company is one wh:ich is organized to 
facilitate the sale of equipment to a manufacturer by the 
company selling t he equipment. The f inance company 
L 
issues bonds based on the collateral of the stock of the 
purchasing company. Wi th this money, the equipment com-
pany is paid for its g oods and the purchasing company's 
credit is not impaired. 
The right of a corporation to hold securities was 
1. Hoagland, H. E.; "Corporation Finance", page 442. 
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generally denied in t h is country up until 1888. It was at 
this time that New Jersey amended its corporation laws to 
perrait the acquiring of stock in othe r corporations. Al-
though some states d i rectly prohibited the owning of stock 
in other corporations, other states i mplicitly took this 
stand. Of course, there is an exception to this rule. 
Corporations have been authorized to acquire stock in 
other corporations by the express act of the legislature. 
The general attitudes towards holding companies were that 
they exceeded the power granted in their charters and hence 
they were based on an ultra vires act. 
The holding company is a stri ctly American innova-
tion. Royal chartered corporations and those chartered by 
special act of Parliament did not ha~e this power. The 
first holding company in the United States was the Baltimore 
and Ohio Railroad Company, "wh ich in 1832 secured permission 
from the legislature of Maryland to acquire stock of the 
Vlashington Branch Road." 1 Pennsylvania, and not New Jersey, 
is responsible for authorizing the first "pure" holding com-
pany. The first of these to be formed was the 
Continental Improvement Company, in 1868 . More than forty 
other such companies were later formed. However, corrup-
tion was present in the legislature of t hat day and many 
charters were obtained t~rough bribery, so that, in 1874, 
the Pennsylvania constitution was amended to prohibit the 
1. Bonbright and Means, "The Holding Company", page 58. 
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legislature from granting any more such special charters. 
The prominence of New Jersey in the holding com-
pany movement was due to the fact that it was the first 
state to change its general incorporation laws to permit 
holding companies. And for some time it was the only 
state whi ch authorized them. The New Jersey Holding Com-
pany Law seems to have been the conception of James B. Dill, 
a youne New York lawyer. Dill conceived the idea that if 
some state would permit the chartering of holding companies, 
a thriving incorporating business could be built up. In 
this way, a substitute for the trust which was being 
severely attacked could be legalized. Dill could not 
interest the authoritieB of his own state, New York, so he 
went to New Jersey and explained his plan to Governor Abbitt. 
The governor saw a method to reduce the state's debt, which 
had been quite heavy since the Civil War. The plan was 
made law in 1893, and Dill organized a company the chief 
business of which was to handle the legal routine of incor-
porating companies under this new law. A tremendous amount 
of free advertising was derived for thi s activity from the 
hostile press criticism of the new holding company law. As 
a result, New Jersey did such a large business in incorporat-
ing that in 1902 all its bonded indebtedness was paid off. 
New .Jersey remained a popular incorporation state 
until 1913, when the Seven Sisters Act, which prohibited 
holding companies and otherwise restricted corporations, was 
passed at the insistence of Woodrow Wils on, the governor of 
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the state at that time. The law was again amended in 1917 
to permit holding companies, but other states such as 
Delaware had become recognized as the incorporating states. 
In consequence, New Jersey never regained its relative posi-
tion of leadership as a state for incorporating. 
When the trusts were dissolved in 1890 the holding 
company was not inunedia.tely appropriated as a vehicle for 
concentration and control~ Many companies used either the 
community of interest or the merger fonn of combination in 
the interim. While the holding company was attractive in 
form, it appeared that it might be ill egal. The panic of 
1893-97 also tended to retard the development of holding 
companies. In 1899 the charter of the Standard Oil Company 
of New Jersey was amended to permit it to own stock of other 
companies. Many other large companies followed the lead of 
t h e Standard Oil Company in fo~1ing holding companies. This 
increased use of the holding company caused many people to 
believe that this form of organization was legal. But in 
the Northern Securities Case the Supreme Court of the United 
states declared a holding company illegal if it results in a 
monopoly. The Clayton Act of 1914 further restricted this 
type of organization by declaring it il l egal if it materially 
lessened the competition between the various companies in the 
holding company organization. Of course, to be affected by 
either the Sherman Anti-Trust Act or the Clayton Act the com-
pany must be engaged in interstate commerce. 
It is evident that the holding companies offered 
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growing American industry a substitute for the illegal 
gentlemen's agreements, pools, and trusts. While mergers 
and consolidations were almays legal, at the same time 
they were more difficult to arrange. According to Profes-
sor Donaldson, "'rhe holding company method of combination 
is one of the easiest , if not the easiest, legal for.m of 
combination to accomplish." 1 To arrange an organization 
by the holding company method, stock of the parent company 
is exchanged for stock of the company which is to enter 
the combination. It is easier to reach an agreement for 
the exchange of stock than for the sale of assets. In 
this way, there is no call for any cash in the transaction. 
This is very important in many cases. 
From the viewpoint of management, the holding com-
pany offers many advantages. In the first place, control 
over billions of dollars of operating property can be 
acquired with a minimum investment by pyrruniding the hold-
ing companies. This is frequently done in the public 
utilities field. The second advantage of the holding 
company is the benefits of large-scale production. The 
holding company can aid its subsidiarie :3 because it has a 
better name and a better credit rating. This type of or-
ganization can also avoid the after-acquired clause of bond 
agreements by organizing a subsidiary which would not be 
affected in its finances by the after-acquired clause in the 
parent company's mortgage. 
1. Donaldson, E. F.; "Business Organi zation and Procedure", 
page 452. 
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It is frequently advantageous to have subsidiar-
ies operating in various states rather than one big cor-
poration, which is considered as a legal outsider in all 
other states. In this way the parent corporation does 
not have to pay foreign corporation taxes, nor is it sub-
ject to any discriminatory legislation which might be 
passed against foreign corporations. Numerous subsidia-
ries permit a large company to experiment with its products 
under the name of one of its less known subsidiaries. 
Separate corporations limit the liability of the parent 
company, and act as insurance to protect it against heavy 
loss. If a subsidiary is sued, only its assets are 
liable in the suit; but if the company were one complete 
unit, its property all over the country might be lost as 
a result of the litigation. If the charter powers of a 
'parent corporation are now restricted, a subsidiary may be 
organized in states where broader powers are delegated. 
Holding companies have several disadvantageous 
features, from the viewpoint of management, but usually 
these features are of minor importance and are far out-
weighed by the advantages. Taxes, or ganization fees, and 
maintenance costs are apt to be larger in the case of a 
holding company with many subsidiaries. OVer-capitaliza-
tion frequently occurs because of high organization costs. 
Goodwill is apt to be lost because of the separation of 
the different subsidiaries. Minority interests may prove 
troublesome if the subsidiaries are not completely owned. 
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The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 
It has long been recognized that public utilities 
are affected with a public interest. Furtherraore, that 
economical operation precludes much competition. As a 
result of these conditi ons, they have been subject to state 
regulation. But because of the tremendous power whi ch 
these companies have, they have been able to influence 
public utilities commissi ons in some states. With the in-
troduction of the holding company in the public utility 
field, the problem became more complex . So, in 1935, the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act was passed by Congress. 
It applies only t o electric utility holding companies and 
gas utility holding companies. The act had two main pur-
poses in view. These were control over the security 
issues of public utility holding companies and simplifica-
tion of the publi c utility holding company system of 
organization. The Securities and Exchan~e Commission can 
not per.mit the issuing of any no-par stock, preferred 
stock, or bonds not secured by a first lien on physical 
property. The Commission may still disapprove of the is-
sue i:f it is not considered to be suitable to the economic 
or efficient ope ration of the company . If the issuance 
fees are exorbitant, or if the issue is detrimental to the 
public, the Comrnission may disapprove of the issue. 
The sections of the law relating to the simplif'i-
cation of the public utility system have been referred to 
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as the "death sentences". The act provides that ail 
registered corporations shall be examined with the pur-
pose of simplifying the system and arranging an equitable 
distribution of tb~ voting power. The second "death sen-
tence" prohibits the "third story11 holding companies. The 
Commission may direct that such holding companies "shall 
cease to be a holding company with respect to each of its 
subsidiary companies which itself has a subsidiary company 
which is a holding company. 111 
Mergers and Consolidations 
In the discussion of the me r ger and consolidation 
as a method of combination, we shoulcl first understand 
what those terms mean. The term "merger" is properly 
used to denote the situation where one corporation, which 
continues in existence, acquires the assets of one or more 
other companies which thereupon cease to exist as legal 
entities~ A consolidation occurs when a new corporation 
is formed to take over the assets of two or more other 
corporations, which then cease to exist legally. This 
new corporation is properly called a consolidated corpora-
tion. In actual practice, these te!ms are used 
interchangeably. The statutes of most states do not dis-
tinguish between consolidations and mergers. 
These forms of combination have been in use in the 
1. Sec. 11 B of the Public Utility Holding Company Act. 
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earliest commercia~ ventures. In t h is country, many o~ 
the early turnp ike companies and railroads were merged or 
consolidated. However , the real cons olidation movement 
did not occur until the eighteen-nineties. At this time 
the pools, agreements, and trusts had been declared 
illegal and the h olding company was considered to be ille-
gal. Many consolidations occurred in the last decade o~ 
the nineteenth century before the holding company was in 
vogue as a method of combination. It is interesting to 
note that a consolidation o~ the American Tobacco Company 
was declared in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
by the Supreme Court in 1911. Thus, the consolidation 
joined the holding company as a type of organizat i on which 
might be illegal if monopolistic. However , the consolida-
tion method was not considered to be in violation of the 
Clayton Act. The consolidation movement continued down to 
our own times. The combination period, whi ch ended in 
1929, saw a large number of combinati ons whi ch were made by 
means of consolidations and mergers. 
Among the several disadvantages of the merger and 
consolidation type of combination are the following: In 
the first place, there are rigid statutory regulations in 
most states concerning this type of organizat ion. Many 
states will permit only corporations in the same line o~ 
business to combine, while othe r states will pennit only 
domestic co rporations to become consolidated. Most states 
require t wo-thirds of the stockholders of the merging 
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companies to give their assent to the combination. Dis-
senting stockholders have a right to have their stocks 
purchased by the companies consolidating, at a fair market 
value. The rights of bondholders carry over into the 
newly consolidated company. If this security is weakened 
they have a right to object to the t r ansaction. Unsecur-
ed bondholders are generally conside r ed to have a right 
against the assets of the constituen~ companies assumed by 
the consolidated company. Aside from this, the unsecured 
creditors have no say in the consolidation. Any sale of 
assets with the purpose of defrauding the general creditors 
is invalid. Creditors may recover t he property or its 
value, if it has not passed into the hands of a bona fide 
purchaser. 
The merger and the consolidation are generally 
more difficult to arrange than a holding company and other 
types of combination. Long negotiat ions are required to 
get independent companies to enter the consolidation. 
Executives don't like to take a subo dinate position in a 
-
newly formed company. More cash is required to finance 
a merger. All activities in this type of organization 
receive publicity. Debts of consti~uent companies must 
be assumed by the newly formed corporation. This may put 
a strain on the company. While in the case of a holding 
company the parent company does not assume responsibility 
for the debts of the subsidiary. 
On the asset side of the ledger for the merger and 
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consolidation type of combinati on, we find principally a 
really centralized form of administration. No extra ex-
pense is required to keep subsidiary administration 
systems which duplicate the parent company 's organization. 
Economy of large-scale production and distribution is as 
great under this type of combination as any other. In 
addition to these advantages, the merger and consolidation 
appear to be legal in most cases. 
the earlier forms of combination. 
This is not true with 
However, this type of 
organizati on is illegal if it is monopolistic under the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law. 
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Chapter III 
THE ECONOMIC ASPECT OF THE CORJ?ORATE COMBINATION MOVENIEliJT 
Importance of the Corporation in the Movement 
We have seen, in the preceding two chapters, the 
development of the corporation and the history of the re-
cent combination movement in the United States. This 
tremendous development has many actuating caus.es and impor-
tant effects on our present economic existence. It is the 
object of this section to show what the most important of 
these factors are, and what effect they have on us as 
individuals living in this twentieth century civilization. 
To understand the importance of the economic as-
pect of the corporate combination movement, it is necessary 
to state what the relative position of the corporate 
instrUL1ent of organization is in relation to the non-cor-
porate enterprise in the economic life of the United States. 
According to a study mad e by the Twentieth Century Fund 
Committee, 11 0f total economic activity in terms of income 
produced, only 57% was conducted through incorporated 
profit-seeking businesses. 111 Of this 57% of the national 
income control l ed by incorporated companies, Mr. Gardner c. 
Means stated that the 200 largest non-financial corporations 
in 1927 controlled over 45% of the assets of all 
1. The Twentieth Century Fund Commit tee; "Big Business: 
Its Growth and its Place", page 16. 
non-financial organi zations; received over 40fo of corpor-
ate income; controlled over 35fo of all business wealth and 
1 between 15' and 25fo of national wealth." This shows to 
v1ha t a tremendous peak of concentration the corporation 
has been utilized. 
In exaraining the economic causes of concentration, 
we find our attention attracted to the simple corporate 
entity itself. According to Tippitts and Livermore, in 
their book entitled "Business Organization and Control", 
"one of the most satisfactory definitions of a corporation 
is that given by Bonneville, who describes it as 'a vol-
untary association of persons natural or legal, organized 
under and recognized by the law as a person, artificial in 
character, having a corporate name and being entirely 
separate and distinct from the persons who compose it, for 
the accomplishment of some particular and specified pur-
pose or purposes. It has continuous succession,during the 
period of life assigned ~y its charter, and the rights to 
perform as an individual being all the functions expressed 
in its charter or implied thereby or incidental thereto'." 2 
The. first, and perhaps the most important, ad van-
tage of the corporation is that it is an artificial person 
entirely distinct from the natural persons who compose it. 
This element of limitation of liability is one of the chief 
1. Means, G. c.; "The Growth in the Relative Importance of 
the Large Corporation in American Economic Life 11 , 
American Economic Review, Vol. XXI, pages 10 - 41. 
2. Tippitts and Livermore; 11 Business Organization and Con-
trol", page 142. 
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factors in promoting large-scale ope r ations. In addi-
tion to t h is, the ease of obtaining capi t al from many 
diversified sources, in the selling of shares at compara-
tively low cost, has been an important advantage. In 
the financing of independent proprietorships and partner-
ships, the total capi t al investment must be supplied by 
one person or by a s mall group of per sons. 
cally limits the siz e of the company. 
This automati-
A second adva.ntage of the corporat i on is the con-
tinui t y of its existence. Other fo rms of business 
organization terminate with the deaths or the proprietors, 
but this is not so in the case or the corporation. The 
ease with which shares of stock can be exchanged or sold in 
the market is another advantage of the corporation. 
Taussig says that 11 transferability, like limitation of 
liability, is advantageous for the community in that it 
malces possible a greater division of r i sks" •1 Anyone in-
-
vesting in a corporation is not committed to remain with 
the company if the company is not doing well. This 
naturally tends to bring ownership into the hands of the 
shrewd and intelligent investor. This, of course, has 
brought into being stock exchanges and the consequent spec-
ulation. This aspect of speculation has brought many 
evils, from an economic point of view, into the control of 
corporations. Many cases of insiders using advance infer-
mation to take advantage of the uninformed stockholders to 
1. Taussig, F. W.; "Principles of Economics", Vol I, pg.85. 
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reap profits in the stock market. Due to the ingenuity 
of the investment bankers in competing for investors' 
funds, safety of principa~ and income at moderate rates 
have been almost insured~ In the words of Professor 
Taussig, "Chiefly as a result of corporate organizati on, 
a sort of abstract or distilled property has grovm up 
exempt from the vicissitudes of industry." 1 
Economic Types of Combination 
In tr ... e previous chapter the various types of com-
binations were discussed primarily from the legal viewpoint. 
From the economic viewpoint there is a different classifi-
cation of the types of organization of big business, howeve~ 
Generally, they are divided into four classifications, i.e. 
the h orizontal combination, the vertical combination, the 
circular combination, and the mixed type of combination. 
Although many l arge corporations fit i nto one of these 
various classes which can definitely be defined, many others 
do not follow any one of the methods of combination but . are 
varieties of one or more of the different types. It is 
this type that is called the mixed type of combinat ion. 
Horizontal combination is the uniting of several 
different companies doing t h e same kind of business under 
one administrative head . Professor Taussig gives the fol-
loviing definition: "Horizontal combination is the union 
1. Taussig, F . W.; "Principles of Economics", Vol. I, p. 90 
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under single management of a ntunber of enterprises of the 
same sort. They are usually few, and each is usually on 
a large scale." 1 This type of combination is typical of 
the so-called trust. The ~~iskey Trust is a good example 
of the horizontal type of union. An effort was made to 
bring all the American distilleries under one management, 
the object being, of course, to control the supply and hence 
the price. 
Integration of industry is the main purpose for 
which vertical coniliines are found. This type of trust oc-
curs when all the successive steps in the manufacturing of 
a product are united under one single management. The 
United States Steel Company is a vertical combination of 
tremendous size. This company owns its mines, its trans-
portation system, and its factories for finishing iron and 
steel. All the work from raw material to finished pro-
duct is controlled by one management. This company, of 
course, also might be classified as a horizontal combine, 
as it controls the majority of enterprises of the same sort 
in many fields of the steel industry. It is significant 
that the movement toward vertical combination is less 
strong than towards horizontal combination. The. desire to 
control the market to some extent is a powerful incentive 
to the latter type of combination. 
Professor Hoagland, in speaking of the circular 
1.· Taussig, F. W.; "Principles of Economics", Vol. ~' p. 59 
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combinati ons says, "This term is used to describe the 
bringing together of products unrelated except that they 
use the same distribution outlets. They are usually 
non-competing products, so that the question of monopoly 
does not arise." 1 The object of such a combination is 
economy of distribution. This method of combination was 
particularly prominent from 1903 to the end of the World 
War. 
Underlying Causes of Corporate Development 
The second section of this paper outlined the 
vari ous methods through which the corporation developed 
its tremendous potentiality for concentration and control. 
Without the corporate structure as a f oundation, most of 
this growth would undoubtedly have been impossible. The 
corporation, however, was not the cause of this growth . 
Many economic fa ct ors of great significance were the cause 
of this expansion of the corporation. 
The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth cen-
tury-'. was of inestimable significance in the development of 
the corporation . Up to this time, most labor was done by 
hand; most manufacturing establishments were of small 
scale because there was no economy in the larger establish-
ments . Transportation was undeveloped and slow. 
Intercourse between outside communities was very limited. 
1. Hoagland , H. E.; "Corporation Finance", page 339. 
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The principle of division of labor had not yet been devel-
oped to any degree. 
But with t he beg inning of the mechanical inven-
' tions in the eighteenth century, industry began to grow. 
In 1764, Hargraves invented the spinning jenny. James 
Watt developed the steam engine to an effective degree in 
1781. Fulton applied the steam engine to navigation in 
1807. The more important application of the steam engine 
to transportation occurred ·when Stephenson developed the 
locomotive in 1830. The series of inventions, of which 
these were most significant, effected that change in our 
economic and social outlook which is now known as the 
Industrial Revolution. 
The essential contribution of the Industrial Revo-
lution was the tapping of enormous sources of natural power. 
Once this power had been eff ectively harnessed, human lab or 
was requi r ed only to guide the machinery. The most impor-
tant result of this machine age has be.en the development of 
the principle of the division of labor. Instead of one 
man working on an article until it was completed, the task 
of making an article was divided into many separate opera-
tions. Each operator in a plant repeated his specialized 
job time after time. When that particular operation on an 
article was completed it was passed on to the next man to 
perform his operation, and t h is continued until the article 
was c ompleted. This meant that industrial plants had to 
be large enough so that they could employ enough workmen to 
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perform all the different operations required in an 
economic production of the article • 
• Adam Smith once stated that the division of labor 
is limited by the extent of the market . With the develop-
ment of the stes~boat and the spread of railroads, the 
markets for manufactured products we re gradually widened 
until today, broadly speaking, there is a world market . 
Different industries cente r in localities wh ich are best 
suited for the producti~n of that particular product. 
Southern New England is noted for its textile ma.nufactur-
ing. Pittsburgh, because of its proximity to t h e coal 
fields, has become the center of the iron and steel indus-
+ • 
... r~es. Ea ch of t hese sections exchanges its specialized 
products for foodstuffs and other commodities from all 
over the world. This is , indeed, a geographical division 
of labor. An other economy of production , gained from 
specialization , has been the proficiency in productive 
skill whi ch results from the exclusive application t o one 
task. 
The division of labor and the development of the 
market are tv10 of the principal results of the Industrial 
Revolution. These principles are imp ortant causes of the 
tendency toward large-scale production. The corporati on , 
an instrument which had been in existence for many years 
previously, becrune an essential factor in the development 
of the large-scal e production industries because of the 
corporation's facility of financing. 
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We have seen, in this chapter, the advantages 
wh ich the corporate forra of organization has to offer to 
large companies. We have also seen the developme nt of 
the mechanical side of industry which requires large size 
companies to make use of these technical advances. We 
will now analyze carefully the other advantages of large-
scale production whi ch caused the present concentration in 
industry. Before beginning this examination, it must be 
understood that these advantages apply to a greater extent 
in some industries than in others. Vfhat is stated will 
be more applicable to those industries which are better 
suited for concentration . 
While many pe ople s t ill look upon competition as 
the keyst one of incentive necessary t o stimulate progress 
in economic life, at the same time the wastes of competi-
tion are frequent ly great . It was believed that 
competition would keep prices down and at the same time 
develop quality; but the consumer was not prepared to test 
the quality of goods, and as a resul t many products of in-
ferior quality were pass ed on t o him. The condition 
became so bad that Congress had to pass a Pure Food Law in 
1906. Many other examples of poor quality resulting from 
competition have ex isted in the past. In the case of 
public utilities , prices were not kept down by competition. 
On the other hand, competition was so ··.costly that prices 
were forced upward. The case of the public utilities is 
unique, but at the same time competiti on has caused an in-
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crease in operating expense, and hence a higher cost than 
is necessary in econmnic production in many industries. 
As the developments of the Industrial Revolution 
were applied to industry, the competiti on for markets was 
greater . Large-scale production flooded the markets 
with g oods which must be sold. Cut-throat price wars 
were engaged in, to the detriment of all the competitors. 
The only visible solution was price and producti on agree-
ments. Once the trend toward colle ctive action on the 
part of industry was started, it developed rather swiftly 
until t oday the concentration of control of industries 
which are largely incorporated has s t imulated much concern 
in certain responsible quarters. 
It is undoubtedly true that restriction of pro-
duction and regulation of prices were the immediate cause 
for most of the industrial combination in the United 
States from 1870 on. Without the attaining of these ob-
jectives it is difficult to say what course the evolution 
of industry would have taken in this country. But it is 
safe to say that the standard of living produced by 
American industry is the highest in the world. This is 
not wholly due to the organization of industry, because 
the natural resources available to industry have been al-
most limitless. The availability of first-class executive 
ability is a second factor in the success of industry in 
this country. 
The protective tariff has been an important factor 
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in the promoting of concentration in industry. The 
tariff was at first defended on the ground that it pro-
tected the "infant industries ". Now the tariff is 
advocated to protect .~erican industry against cheap 
foreien labor. In many cases the tariff has been more 
than enough t o protect the Amer ican worker against cheap 
foreign competiti on. This has made possible a develop-
ment of concentration in industry which might not have 
occurred otherwise . 
"One of the largest of the wastes is the unneces-
sary expenditure for salesmen under the competitive syste~ 
Vlhere there is compet ition, the sales agents everywhere 
overlap one another in their work." 1 This is the opinion 
of c. R. van Hise , a student of the trust problem. In 
addition t o the above, the cost of advertising in the com-
petitive field is very large. Each company must push its 
product before the public, and the cost is therefore 
multiplied by the nlli~ber of companies in the field. 
An other important caus e of concentration in indus-
try was the secret arrangements between railroad companies 
and manufacturine; corporations,under which rebates were 
given. An outstanding example of this system of rebates 
existed in the case of the Standard Oil Company. As a 
matter of fact, the Standard Oil Company surpassed all its 
competitors in profiting by unfair freight rates. The 
Standard Oil Company not only receives a rebate of forty 
1. VanHise, c. R.; "Concentration and Control", page 88. 
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cents a barrel on its own shipments which cost eighty cents 
a barrel, acco rding to published schedules, but also it 
received a draw-back of forty cents on every barrel its 
competitors shipped. Thus, if all it s competitors shipped 
as much as Standard Oil itself did, the·re· was no real cost 
in shipping Standard oil. And if the competitors shipped 
more than the Standard Oil Company, it made a profit on the 
competitors' shipments. This pract ice of granting rebates 
had a compounding effect on the corporations receiving them. 
None but the large corporations rec e ived rebates, and those 
consolidated companies were made str onger merely because of 
being large. This practice is of course illegal at the 
present time. Both the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act considered this an unfair method of compe-
tition, so tl~t today this method of doing business has 
practically vanished. 
It seems that the old proverb, 11 to them that have, 
is g iven", is true in the case of large corporations. Once 
a large corporation has become estab l ished, it has a very 
effective weapon, with which to drive out smaller competi-
tors,in the fo~1 of local under-selling. "The giant cor-
porations, having the advantage of a large business and 
wide markets, may sell even at a los s in a given community 
until the competitor is obliged to discontinue, the loss 
to the large company being recouped by large profits else-
where~ "1 Local underselling bec~~e illegal, however, with 
1. Van Rise, c. R.; "Concentration and Control", page 23. 
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the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914. But a method was 
conceived whereby the spirit of this law was avoided. The 
substance of this plan was that if the subsidiary company 
would do the price-cutting, the parent company would not 
lose the goodwill of the public, nor would it be subject 
to the Clayton Act. 
The patent is another factor aiding concentration. 
In some industries, patents control many essential me chan-
ical processes. The holder of such a patent controls a 
virtual monopoly in that field. Ac cording to men like 
Edsel Ford, the patent is not so important. He stated 
that their patents are not closely held but are open to 
the automobile industry. But companies such as the United 
Shoe Machinery have a much different policy. This company 
so fully controls the patents on machinery to manufacture 
inexpensive shoes that they refuse to sell; they mere ly in-
stall the machinery in a factory at a rental. It has 
absorbed or driven out many of its competitors. 
BU.sine.ss Advantages 
There are rnany advantages of large-scale concen-
trated industry which are not strictly causes of the 
combination movement but which are material incentives. 
The most important incentive is probably the business 
advantages. Big companies are able to buy in large quan-
tities and thus take advantage of the lowest rates of 
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purchase. Secondly, large organizations are able to sell 
in large quantities and thus reduce marketing expenses. A 
large cost of doing business today is the marketing ex-
pense. The cost of marketing, when spread over many 
units of production, lowers the total cost. As an 
example of this, when the Whiskey Trust was formed, not 
only were many distilleries shut down but three hundred 
salesmen were released because of a better integrated sys-
tem of marketing. \.~ere there is a large combination 
with branches located all over the country, orders can be 
routed to the nearest branch, thus saving much expense for 
transportation. Large orders can be filled much more 
promptly by large concerns. 
Large corporations are much better equipped fi-
nancially to enter foreign trade than are the smaller 
companies. This is particularly true when the foreign 
markets are already in the hands of foreign competitors. 
The United states Steel Corporation and the Standard Oil 
Company do more than 90% of the export business in their 
lines. This business has largely been developed since 
these combinations have been founded. And although many 
corporations, including the Standard Oil Company, have 
been attacked as illegal, the Yiebb Pomerene Act permits 
them in foreign trade. 
An additional benefit to be found in concentrated 
industries is the decrease in loss from bad debts. Large 
companies are not forced to deal with every buyer, 
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irrespective of ability to pay. Because these large com-
panies are not subject to keen competition, they can pick 
and choose their credit risks. "One of the greatest ad-
vantages of concentration is the cooperation of the 
independent units in the regulation of production." 1 
Cycles of under-production during prosperity are charac-
teristic of the competitive capitalistic system. But if 
cooperation replaces competition (and this is possible 
only where there are large units) great savings can be 
had by regulating capital investment in such a way that 
industrial plants can run full time a t max i mum production. 
Large concerns can make more efficient use of 
capital. Because of the diversificat ion of products and 
sales areas, peaks of production can be leveled off. Thus 
need for larger amounts of capital at certain seasons can 
be avoided. ·The company can then become independent of 
the banks and finance itself with t he smal ler re~uired 
amount of capital. The necessity for management with ex-
traordinary executive ability is greater in large 
businesses. Vlhile la rge companies can afford to employ 
top-ranking executives, at the same time any error made by 
these executives is magnified greatly because of the tre-
mendous size of the business. 
Many people claim that the large corporation af-
fords better social donditions for its workers. Among 
these advantages are steady employment of labor, better 
1. van Rise, c. F.; "Concentration and Control", page 18. 
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wages, more protection against industrial accident~, etc. 
All these f a ctors g o to devel op the morale of the workers 
and hence aid in economic pro<llucti on . But the point is 
that, although big co rporations are more financially able 
to arrange these benefits for their employees than the 
smaller companies, at the same time these advantages are 
not instituted by the big corporations in many cases. 
The Industrial Advantages 
The industrial advantages of large-scale industry 
are of greater importance than the business advantages. 
The integration of industry is perhaps the most important 
of these advantages. Integration means that one large 
company handles not only one stage of manufacture, but a 
number of stages, or even all of the stages from the raw 
material to the finished product. Th is enables the dif-
ferent units to work in harmony with one another, thus 
g iving greater economy . No duplication of effort or un-
necessary waste of time is encountered in a well integrated 
combination. 
In carrying the theory of integration to its 
log ical conclusi on, we touch on the practice of cons oli-
dated allied industries. In this case, companies are 
absorbed into the parent company whi ch use by-products of 
the large parent company. In this way , by-products are 
used more efficiently. An illustrat i on of this type of 
consolidation is the United States Steel Corporation. 
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This company has begun the manufacture of cement,using 
slag, a by-product of the blast furnace, for that purpose. 
This is but one example of the saving of by-products. In 
many industries, the utilization of by-products is a very 
important part of the income. This is particularly true 
in the chemical and metallurgical industries. But these 
savings are not possible ex~ept in the large-scale indus-
tries. 
The research work which many large companies do 
is very valuable not only to themselves but to the general 
public. Investigation work ·is done not only on the 
development of new products and new uses for by-products 
but many new processes are discovered. Thene develop-
ments are made possible by companies with large resources. 
The large company, in addition, is able to employ the 
latest and most efficient machinery, methods, and labor-
saving devices. The recognit ion and application of these 
new developments in industrial production means the 
increased proclucti on of better quality articles at a lower 
cost. Eventually these savings will be passed on to the 
consumer . 
The handling of material on a large scale, itself 
gives great economy. Industries v~1ich require small 
amounts of material will be forced to pay a higher trans-
portation cost per unit. An example of this is that 
carload lots are alvmys less expensive to ship than split 
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carload lots. The same principle applies with in the fac-
tory; Small companies will be prone to depend more on 
manual labor, while the larger companies will acquire 
mechanical methods of transportation etc. 
Limitation to the Size of Large - Scale Il:!_~ust:ry 
The preceding pages have been devoted to present-
ing the many fac t ors wh ich tend to concentration in 
industry, but it must be realized that the greater part of 
industry is not concentrated. It also must be realized 
that, even in the industries where concentration has de-
veloped to a great extent, it still has a limit beyond 
which it can not go. Perhaps legal restrictions were 
applied before the economic limit has been reached, but 
it is nevertheless there. In speaking of the limitations 
of large-scale production, Professor Taussig states that 
"the limitations on large-scale production are mainly from 
the infirmities of human nature. The extension of the 
scale of operations means an ever-increasing reliance on 
. 1 
spontaneous self-interest." He goes on to point out 
that in industry the faithfulness of the worker can be 
controlled better because a routine can be established. 
But in agriculture, where there is little or no check on 
the worker, large-scale production does not develop. 
1. Taussig , C. F.; "Principles of Economics", Volume I, 
page 55. 
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These principles of control also tend to regulate the size 
of all other industries to a greater or lesser extent. 
But there are several other factors which limit 
the size of concentration in industry. The most important 
of these is, perhaps, the prin ciple of diminishing returns. 
W'hen t he point is reached whe r e the cost of production and 
distribution becomes higher than in l ess centralized com-
panies, then the peak of economic con centration ha s been 
reached. Whether or not this prin ciple would actually 
limit the size of combinations in the face of the great 
power these corporations exert is doubtful, but in a system 
where competition is not too closely re gulated the check on 
concentration would actually become effectual. Th is point 
is illustrated by the rema.rks of Judg e Gary of the United 
States Steel Corpora tion, who said that the mere size of 
the United States Steel Corpor2-tion would not maintain its 
place of leadership in that industry if the most progress-
ive and efficient business policies were not put into 
effect. 
The restrictions of men's faculties illustrate 
another reason \7hy combination does not proceed at a. 
greater rate. The energy, anillition, and intelligence of 
individual men are the motive forces behind combination. 
Relatively few individuals have this capacity for industrial 
leadership. Men like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller set 
the pace in t he development of indust r y, and the people 
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benefit by their work. But this genius for business 
leadership is limited, and hence industrial development 
is not as fast as it might be. 
Evils of t h e Comb i nation Movement 
The effects of the combination movement have 
been several. We will examin e the social effects in a 
later chapter but in this part we will examine the econo-
mic results. Looking at the problem from a broad view-
point, many people will agree that the beneficial effects 
have outweighed the evils of concentration. In elabor-
ating the causes of concentration we have, at the same time, 
presented t he advantages of comb inat i on. But there have 
been many accompanying evils which have aroused dissatisfac-
tion with the movement. 
One of the most important of these drawbacks has 
been overcapitalizat ion. This occurs when securities 
issued are not repre s ented by a corresponding value in as-
sets, dollar for dollar. The formation of the United 
States Steel Corporatien offers an exceptional example of 
overcapitalization. This company was founded in 1901 by 
Andrew Carnegie with the combining of eight large companies 
in the steel industry. The capitalization of the new com-
pany was made at fl,402,846,817. Of this amount, 
$808,227,391 was common stock. "As a result of careful 
investigation, the conwission of corporations concluded 
that a fair valuation of the entire phys ical property of 
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the United States Steel Corporation at the time of its 
organization was $676,000,000." 1 As a result, Tippetts 
and Livermore state that "in many of the combinations 
formed, the cormnon stock was all water as in the case of 
United States Steel Corporation. 112 This meant that this 
company was overcapitalized to the amount of $70o,ooo,ooo. 
This evil of overcapitalization brings into view 
not only a cause of consolidation but an evil thereof 
the desire for promoter's profits. The early methods of 
combination were not readily subject to this disadvantage. 
But ·Tippetts and Livermore state that "in many of the 
combinations formed after 1890, and especially those call-
ed into being between 1898 and 1903, the expectation of 
profit from promotion was a lure of no mean signif'icance. 113 
The promoter was paid in stock of the newly formed corpora-
tion, frequently excessively. To realize his profits the 
promoter had to sell his stock in the market. Frequently 
earnings were paid on the watered. stock when there really 
were none. This was done in order to maintain the price 
of the promoter's stock. Many companies used watered 
-
stock as an easy method to pay off the promoters. 
Excessive prices have been another drawback re-
sulting from the combination movement. This has resulted 
1
• Van Rise, c. R.; "Concentration and Control", page 115. 
2. Tippetts and Livermore, "Business Organization and Con-
trol11, page 351. 
3; Ibid, page 350. 
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from the semi-monopolistic position some of these large 
companies held. It is said that the Standard Oil Company 
controlled 90~ of that business in this country. It has 
been the exception, rather than the rule, when these large 
companies have passed on the savings resulting from their 
more economic production. When the United States Steel 
Company could pay off its bonded indebt edness and 7~ on 
its preferred stock and 2.9% to 4% on the con~on stock and 
at the same time s~ueeze most of the water out of five hun-
dred milJ.ion dollars worth of common stock in less than 
twenty years, the price of steel must have been excessive. 
Fre~uently price discriminations have been applied in 
domestic trade. Many times, under the protective tariff 
large companies have maintained a higher price for the 
same product in domestic marlcets than abroad. 
The unfair trade practices in which many large con-
porat ions indulged have been very detrimental and demoraliz-
ing ta the economic structure. The question of rebates 
and draw-backs has been mentioned previ ously. Many com-
panies controlling transportation faci l ities and pipe lines 
have been unfair in de aling with the small businesses. The 
practice of local underselling in order to drive out 
business has also been engaged in. The American Tobacco 
Company frequently engaged in ruthless methods of competi-
tion. Local underselling by supposedly independent 
companies using the so-called fighting brands to drive out 
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competiton, Many times the business of competitors was 
placed under secret espionage. If these methods failed 
to weaken the more securely entrenched competitors, they 
were purchased if necessary and at very high prices. 
There were many other unfa ir practices in vogue with the 
industrial leaders during the combinat i on period of indus-
try in this country. Frequently treachery occurred, and 
almost theft was employed to aid in the development of 
some of our "giant" corporations of today. But these 
·-
problems were not necessarily connected with big business 
only, but were characteristics of that period of rugged 
individualism which to a certain extent pervaded all sizes 
and all lines of business endeavors. 
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Chapter IV 
THE CEANGING METHODS OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
Introduction 
According to the theory of corporate organiza-
tion, control was exercised by the owners according to 
the extent of their ownership. But the newly developed 
corporation giants, the so-called quasi-public corporations, 
do not actually function in this manner. The property 
rights in these large companies are very complex. St ock-
holders and bondholders have very definite legal rights in 
the eyes of the law. In connection with this situation 
Mr. P . M. O'Leary says, "Professional managers, wage earn-
ers, bankers, and the general public have, if not legally 
recognized property rights, at least segments of interest 
in the large corporation for which they work, to which 
they render financial services, or from which they obtain 
goods and services • 111 It is the inti·usion of the inter-
est of some of these groups and the dispersion of control 
of the theoretical owners , the stockholders, which have 
caused a new picture of corporate control to arise. 
In defining the term control in the corporate 
sense, we mean the location of the power which elects the 
1. O'Leary, P. M.; "Corporate Enterprise in Modern Econo-
mic Life", page 25. 
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board of directors. Legally, this power still resides 
with the stocl~older. In the large bulk of small cor-
porations this is still true, but in large companies it 
is the exception. Only in a closely held company like 
the Ford Motor Company d oes the control still remain in 
the hands of the owners. 
With the exception of control by complete 
ownership of a corporation, the power of control by 
stockholders is at once weakened. In most of the small 
corporations control is exercised by a majority vote. In 
this case control is held in the hands of the majority. 
Because it is a corporative venture the minority must 
necessarily surrender their rights of control to the ma-
jority. Thus we see that in its ess ence the corporate 
system separates ownership from control. People who in-
vest their capital in a corporation have little chance of 
controlling their enterprise. However, any radical 
change in the corporation or its charter requires the con-
sent of the minority interest. And any action considered 
prejudicial to the corporation can be blocked by the 
minority. But this simple step of the separation of 
ownership from control has always been considered socially 
advisable. In the large corporation, control has been 
separated even more completely from the owners. 
There are several legal devices which can be used 
to separate control from ownership. Control, of course, 
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is based on maj ority control which is achieved through the 
investment of a much smaller amount of capital than would 
ordinarily be needed to control such a majority of stock. 
The most important of these devices is the holding company . 
Through the method of pyramiding,a small parent company 
with capital stock of but a few million dollars can control 
billions of dollars of corporate assets. Insull used this 
system t o control his vast public utilities empire. The 
Van Sweringen Brothers used a similar system to control a 
great railroad system. The holding company is a simple de-
vice. By the purchase of a majority of the voting stock of 
a much larger company, the parent company can control it. 
The parent company is usually financed by large issues of 
bonds and non-voting preferred stock. So that a controll-
ing interest in the holding company may be obtained by the 
ownership of the majority of the voting stock, the issue of 
which is relatively small compared with the whole financial 
structure of the company. The easiest method of extending 
the control of the holding company is by the purchase of a 
majority interest of the small issue of voting .stock of 
other holding companies. 
A second device for obtaining legal control with a 
small investment is non-voting common stock. Professor W. 
z. Ripley says of that: 11 The two twelve months 1924-25 
promise to go down in history like the year of the 
Plague, or the Year of the Big Wind as the Years of the 
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Split Common St ock and the Vanishing Stockholders. 111 
This method of disfranchising stockholders had never been 
developed to any extent before this era. When many o:f 
the trusts were starting, about 1898-1908, preferred stock 
was g iven to the owners of absorbed competitors for the 
agreed on valve of the assets o:f the competitors. But 
this stock had voting ri ghts, because the previous com-
petitors did not want to lose complete control o:f their 
investment. 
A notable example of this method was the non-
voting common stocks of the Dodge Company Incorporated, 
issued in 1925. In t h is case neither preferred s t ocks 
nor four-fifths of the common stock was entitled to vote 
in the election of directors. Dillon Reade and Company 
paid themselves a nice profit for financing this company 
and retained control of a $130 1 000,000 concern by invest-
ing less than $2,250,000 in 250,000 chares of voting stock. 
A variation of this method of non-voting stock is the 
issuing of a l arge block of stock having excessive voting 
power to the controlling group. Regular stock would have 
voting power of 1/20 vote per share, while the stock. 
issued to the controlling group would have one vote per 
share. 
The voting trust is a· ~third method of control in 
whi ch not even legal ownership of a majority of the stock 
1. Ripley, w. z .; "Main Street and VIall Street", page 24. 
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is required. This method involves the creating of a 
group of trustees with power to vote all stock placed in 
trust with it. In this manner, when the trustees hold 
a majority of the voting stock they can insure control of 
the corporation without any ownership necessary on the 
part of the trustees. Although this method has been op-
posed bitterly, because it separated control from ownership , 
it has been legalized in many states. The voting trust 
has commonly been limited to a short period during which it 
could run, but in most cases it was renewabl e and hence 
could be continued. Berle and Means state that .t'The vot-
ing trust, more completely than any device we have hitherto 
considered, separates control from all ownership interest."l 
The methods of control previously mentioned are 
all based on a legal status. In each case control rested 
on the legal power to vote a majority of the stock and not 
on actual ownership of the stock. Such a system of con-
trol extends the separation of ownership from control one 
step further. Control is thus passing from the hands o:f 
the owners. Vested agents are springing up with manage-
ment rights but no great responsibility for failure or 
mismanagement . 
Control of corporations by methods previously men-
tioned can be used with greatest success in the smaller 
corporations. The quasi -public or corporation giant is 
1. Berle and Means, "The Modern Corp. and Private Prop.", 
page 77. 
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usually too large for such manipulation. However, in the 
large corporation majority control is not usually neces-
sary. Stock is so widely dispersed and the indifference 
of the stocl< .. holder is such that minority groups can 
control the de s tiny of the corporation. This means that 
control is in the hands of that g roup which has enough 
proxies in addition to its own holdings to control a major-
ity of votes at the annual stockholders• meetings. This 
also means that no other minority group has a sufficiently 
large holding around which can be added proxy votes of 
scattered stockholders to control a majority of votes at 
stockholders' meetings. 
It is just this inabili t y to arrange a majority 
interest in the corporation which makes for complete 
separation of control from ownership. And this, in turn, 
leads to management control. As long as management and the 
minority interest group cooperate with one another, the 
minority control is perpetuated. But the proxy machinery 
is usually in t he hands of the management group. The 
management naturally appoints members to the proxy cmmldt-
tee which are subservient to it. If the management falls 
out with the minority, this group must finance a proxy 
battle with the management. ·when the issue is thus put 
to the stockhol ders, majority rule is again relied upon for 
control of the corporation. In either case, a minority 
interest is perpetuated or a management interest, with 
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almost no ownership rights, is placed in control of the 
corporation. This emphasizes the importance of manage-
ment in the control of the large corporation. 
But real management control occurs when no indi-
vidual or small minority has an interest large enough to 
dominate the affairs of the company . This situation oc-
curs in many large Ameri can corporations . Stockholders 
are so widely dispersed that no single invest or is able to 
put important pressure on the management . The Pennsylvania 
Railroad set-up offers a striking example of t his phenomenon. 
The largest single stockholder in this corporation owns but 
34/100 of one percent of the total stock outstanding; and 
the twenty largest holders of this stock have but 2.7 per-
cent of the total stock. Even the total holdings of all 
the directors amounted to less than one percent of the total 
stock outstanding. 
Of the 200 companies represented in Berle and 
Means' study, more than half of the a ssets represented 
belonged to companies with 50,000 stockholders or more . And 
only compani es representing 5 percent of the assets of the 
200 companies had less than 5000 stockholders each . Berle 
and Means state tha t 11 With only two maj or exceptions, the 
larger the size of the company the smaller was the proper-
' 1 
tion of stock held by the management ... They go on to say, 
1. Berle and Means , 11 The Modern Corp. and Private Prop.", 
pages 52 and 53. 
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"It is clea r, then, that the dispersion of ownership has 
gone to tremendous lengths among the largest companies and 
has progressed to a cons iderable extent among the medium 
sized. Furthermore, it may be said that in general the 
larger the company, the more likely is its ownership to be 
diffused among a multitude of individuals. It is also 
clear that the dispersion is a continuing process~"l 
Some of the factors causing the dispersion are as 
follows: many companies have made a concerted effort to 
sell an interest in t heir corporation to employees and the 
general conslli~ing public. The increase in federal income 
surtaxes has decreased the size of former sources of 
capital, with the well-to-do investor. Furthermore, it 
has been considered good public relations to spread inter-
est with the general public. By interesting the public, 
less trouble was expected from governmental investigation. 
If, as some authorities believe, there will be an increase 
in t h e attempt to attract the small investor to corporate 
securities, the spread of ownerships will continue to be 
greater and greater, and control will tend to become more 
centralized. 
The method of electing the board of directors 
offers an interesting insight into the question of just 
where control of t he large modern corporation lies. A 
stockholder has t wo methods of voting his stock. He can 
1. Berle and Means, 11 The Modern Corp. and Private Prop. 11 , 
pages 52 and 53. 
84. 
vote it personally or sign a proxy presented to him by the 
management. If he votes i~ personally, it is exceptional 
but if he does so his vote carries little weight. If he 
signs the proxy he merely endorses the committee which has 
been appointed by the management and which is subservient 
to it. In neither case wi ll he be able to employ any 
measure of control. Management can thus perpetuate itself 
because of the wide dispersion of stock. 1 
Of course, a small minority may attempt to seize 
control or t o form a protective committee if the company is 
mismanaged . In this case stockholders can exercise a de-
cisive controlling influence. But these situations seldom 
occur. Usually the stockholders act as rubber stamps with 
little or no i nfluence on the activities of the corporati on. 
In this way ownership has been separated from control. And 
control has been placed in the hands of the management, 
which has little or no O\Vl1.ersh ip rights in the enterprise. 
The managers do not wi eld a complete independent 
and unopposed authority. Frequently they use this author-
ity for groups whi ch they represent. At other times, 
outside groups which might prove harn~ul must be placated. 
Banking institutions offer an example of outside interests 
which may affect and control the destinies of a corporation. 
Banking houses perfonn an important and necessary service 
1. It is important to note that in many states cumulative 
voting is required by law. This enables the ordinary 
stockholder to exert more control over h is corporation . 
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and their manipulation should not be too hastily condemned . 
But because of their key position in relation to business 
enterprise, they are able to wie ld more power than would 
seem justified. In speaking of this situation, P. M. 
O'Leary says, "Rath er is it a significant symptom of, a 
consequence of, a refle ction of the great change that has 
been wrought in the nature of private property by the de-
velopment of the large, widely 1 owned 1 corporation as the 
predominant form of business organizat ion •••• The seg-
ment of banking interest has been able to take unto itself 
what may well seem to be an unwarrantably large share of 
corporate control, because among the conflicting segments 
of interest it has occupied a peculiarly strong strategic 
position. 111 
To estimate the extent to which the different 
types of control are used is difficult, and estimates only 
can be arrived at. In many cases i nformati on is carefully 
guarded. 
checked. 
In other situations, infornmtion could not be 
Berle and Means, whose statistics will be pre-
sented, say, 11 V:ihile these percentages do not reflect a 
static condition, and while in many cases they are based 
only on careful guesses, their cumulative effect is such 
as to indicate the great extent to which control of these 
companies rests on some factor other than ownership alone; 
1. O'Leary, P.M.; 11 Corporate Enterprise in Modern Economic 
Life 11 , page 47. 
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and, more strikine still, the extent to which the manage -
ment has itself become the control ." 1 
Table Number 1 2 
Ultimate Con t r ol of the 200 Largest Corporations in 1930 
(Selected by Berle & Means) 
Management Control • 
Legal Device • . . . . . 
Minority Control • • 
Majority Ownership . . . . 
Private Ownership 
In Hands of the Rec eiver • 
By Number 
44fo 
2lfo 
By Wealth 
58fo 
22fo 
l4fo 
2Yo 
4fo 
l fo negligible 
From table number l and chart nunilier l it can be 
seen that 65 percent of the companies and 80 percent of 
their combined wealth is controlled either by management 
or by a legal device involving a small proportion of own-
ership. Only ll, percent of the companies and 6 percent 
of their wealth we re controlled by a group of individuals 
owning half or more of the stock ownership outstanding . 
In this table, industrials and utility companies are con-
solidated. From a further breakdown of the figures, it 
1. Berl e and Means, "The Modern Corp . and Private Property", 
page 94. 
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appears that utilities show the greatest separation of 
ownership from control. Rail roads closely follow in 
second position. Industri a ls are rated in third posi-
tion, but a maj orit y of the companies and of the 
corporate we a lth i s controlled i n t his manner . 
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Chapter V 
THE EXTENT OF INCORPORATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
In a discussion of the subject of the develop-
ment of the corporation as an instrument of business 
concentrates, a survey of the present position of the 
corporation in relation to concentrati on is important. 
Such a survey naturally encompasses a wide scope. Many 
volumes might be written on the subject and yet not com-
pletely cove r the situati on. The purpose of this 
chapter is to indicate in a general way the present ex-
tent of incorporation in the major lines of industry. 
Se condly, to show to what extent 200 largest corporations 
are concentrated. And finally, to show to what extent 
large corporations generally affect the economic life of 
the country. 
At the outset it is wise to warn against making 
any hasty or ill-advised conclusions from the statistics 
to be presented. It has been said that statistics can 
be used to prove anything. The method of collecting sta-
tistical data is important. Many authors with a point 
to prove, consci ously or oth erwise instill bias in their 
data and hence in their conclusions. In this section 
particular reference wil l be made to ~Big Business, Its 
Growth and Place", published by the Twentieth Century 
Fund Incorporated; Berle and Means' "The Modern Corpora-
.90. 
tion and Private Property"; and "Concentration and Con-
trol in Ameri can Industry" by H. w. Laidler . 
The widespread interest of late in the corpora-
tion has tended to exaggerate the importance of the 
corporation beyond its rightful place. Certainly the 
most numerous formsof business organization existing to-
day are in the unincorporated class . In regard to the 
percent of national income produced by non-corporate 
forms of organizati on, it is found to be a little less 
than one half of the national income 43 percent, to 
be exact. However, the corporation is supreme in the 
public utility field, transportation, manufacturing, and 
mining and quarrying fields. It is in these fields that 
we wi ll examine concentration most closely, for the evi-
dent reasons that corporations dominate them and that 
those lines of industry are more suitable to concentra-
tion than the others. 
According to the Twentieth Centur y Fund study of 
corporations "From only 6 percent in agriculture, the 
domination of the corp orati on ranges up to 92 percent and 
96 percent, or almost complete control, in manufacturing 
and mining, respectively. 11 1 As table II and Chart II 
will show, the construction industry, the service industry, 
and mis cellaneous industries are mainly organized on a 
1. Twentieth Century Fund Committee, 11 Big Business , Its 
Gro wth and Place", page 19. · 
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non-corporate basis, while finance, trade, transportation, 
public utili t ies, manufacturing and mining industries are 
largely controlled by corporations. 
1 Table Number II 
Re lative Importance of Various Branches of Economic Activi-
ty, and Percent of Total Income Produced by Corporations in 
Each Branch 1929 
Government 
Agriculture & Related Industries 
Construction 
Miscellaneous 
Service: Amusements & Hotels 
Finance: Banking, Insurance, etc. 
Trade 
Transportation & Public Utilities 
Manufacturing 
Mining & ~uarrying 
All Branches 
Percent of 
National In-
come Produc-
ed 
7.8fo 
9.1 
3.7 
5.2 
10.2 
13.6 
13.7 
11.1 
23.3 
23 
100. fo 
Percent of 
Income Pro-
duced by 
Corporations 
in Each 
Branch; es-
timate 
6 1o 
33 
33 
33 
56 
63 
86 
92 
96 
57 fo 
The use of the national income as an index of the 
extent of incorporation is only one method of measuring 
the extent of the control of the corporation. Other 
methods are the number of plants controlled by corporations, 
1. Twentieth Century Fund Committee, "Big Business, Its 
Growth and Place", page 17. 
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and the number of wage-earners on co r porations' payrolls. 
But t he control of national income seems to be one of the 
most pertinent measures of the influence of the corporate 
organi zation on the economic life of the country. 
Perhaps the clearest picture of the importance of 
the corporation in the field of business concentration can 
be found in terms of the assets. Vlhile the picture of 
fixed assets may be expanded, yet in s tudying the whole 
picture we will find tb.at t he smaller companies are sub-
ject to the same practice. Hence jrhe picture will be in 
proportion. The use of income figures is not quite as 
satisfactory because, as Berle and Means have shown, 
large companies do not always include the income from all 
their holdings. Secondly, large companies tend to have 
a higher bonded indebtedness. Interest payments on debts 
such as the s e are deducted before the "statutory net in-
1 
come is computed .• 11 
-The s tatistical data collected on the concentra-
tion in American industry do not show the complete picture. 
J~ethods of organ ization such as interlocking directorates, 
activiti es of trade associations, and informal agreements 
are thought by many to make the control of' industry even 
more concentrated. Professors -. .Jenks and Clark, in their 
study of the trust problem, state that "Everywhere in 
1. Berle and :Means, 11 The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property 11 , pages 29 and 30. 
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manufacturing , distributing, retailing, competition has 
given way in some degree to industrial monopoly." 1 These 
~uthors maintain that, Vlhile trusts have been dissolved, 
little investigation has occurred to see whether monopoly 
still exists. To this effect they say that'under these 
circumstances it seems safe to say that the trusts of to-
day include n ot only those whi ch are being discovered, 
attacked, or suspected at the moment but a much larger 
number which , if f ormerly convicted, still remain to 
violate the law or , if not yet discovered, restrain compe-
tition unhindered~ 2 
According t o the study made by the Twentieth 
Century Fund , "Only non-financial corporat ions are con-
sidered: 375 out of 287,575 or . 13 percent owned 
56 .2 percent of the total assets." 3 These 375 largest 
non-financial corporations had assets of $ 50,000,000 or 
more . In the manufactur i ng industries these were 119 of 
the largest corp orati ons. There were 207 in the field 
of transportation and public utility. And 49 of these 
giant companies were in agriculture, mining, cons truction, 
trade, and service, combined . 
On the other side of the picture we find that in 
1. Jenks and Clark, "The Trust Problem", page 53. 
2 . Ibid, page 54 . 
3. The Twentieth Century Fund Committee, "Big Business, 
Its Growth and Its Pl ace", page 54. 
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1933 there were 211,586 corporati ons or about 95 per-
cent of all corporations with total assets of less than 
$1,000,000. This great bulk of corporate enterprise own-
ed in the aggregate only 14.1 percent of the assets of all 
corporati ons. The contrast of t h is picture to the previous 
sur vey of the giant corporation is significant. It VJill 
be . seen that giant corporations 
.13 percent of all cor-
porations control 56 percent of al l corporate wealth ; 
and that the remaining 44 percent of corporate wealth is 
spread ove r 95 percent of the smaller corporations, 
211,586 in nmnber. 
Berle ancl Means present an even more sta rtling 
picture of corporate concentration. They state that the 
200 largest corporations in the United States cont r ol 
over 49.2 percent of the national wealth . ••These compan-
ies 42 railroads, 52 public utilities, and 106 inclus-
trials each with assets of over $ 90,000,000 had 
combin ed assets at the beg inning of 1930 of $81,0?4,000,000. 
According to an estimate based on income tax fi gures, the 
total assets of all non-banking corp orations at the be-
ginning of 1930 amounted to $165,000,000,000 while the re-
maining half of the national wealth was owned by more than 
300,000 smaller companies ." 1 In sumn1ing up Berle and 
Means statistics, we present the following table III and 
chart III. 
1. Berle and I·.1eans, "The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property", page 28. 
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Relative Importance of Large Corporations 
(On or about January 1, 1930) 
Proportion of Corporate Wealth 
(other than banking) Controlled 
by the 200 Largest Corporations 
Proportion of Business ~ealth 
(other than banking) Controlled 
by the 200 Largest Corporations 
Proportion of Nat i anal · real th 
Controlled by t h e 200 Largest 
Corporations 
Results ob-
tained by 
actual com-
putation 
49.2fo 
38. fa 
22. fo 
Probable 
Limits 
15%-25fo 
As was stated in the beginning of this section, 
the methods with which statistical data are compiled should 
be carefully examined before reaching any conclusion. Mr. 
VJ . L. Crurn, in a critical estimate of Berle and Means' study, 
surmnarizes his article in the Ameri can Economic Review en-
titled 11 Concentration of Economic Power't as follows: "rry 
two principal points are: that the authors treat all non-
financial corporations as a single class in this analysis, 
with the result that they fail to reveal the dominant in-
fluence of the public utilities (including railroads) upon 
these statistical findings and fail also to bring out the 
great diversity in degree of concentration among various 
1. Berle and Means, "The :Modern Corporation and Private 
Pro perty", page 32 . 
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lines of industry; and that, by confining their analysis 
of income data to corporations earning net income, the 
authors are using a sample which presumably is not ade-
quate or representative and concerning the adequacy or 
representativeness of which they present no evidence. 
• • 
• • These, and numerous minor points, force me to the con -
elusion that this statistical argument does not constitute 
. 1 
scientific proof." 
Another striking bit of data whi ch Berle and 
Means presented is the rate of growth of the corporation. 
They say that "Fqr the period from 1909 to 1928 their 
(the 200 largest corporations) annual rate of growth has 
been 5.4 percent, while that of all corporation (assuming 
their estimates are reliable) had amounted to only 3.6 
percent, and for corporations other than the largest 200 
onl y 2 percent. The large corporation would thus appear 
to be increasing in wealth over 50 percent faster than 
all corporations, or over two and one half times as fast 
as smaller corporat ions." 2 
Although we will not be able to go into the field 
of financial concentration very far, at the same time 
certain conditions should be realized. There has been a 
decided growth in consolidations, branch and chain banking 
since 1920. The unseen power which many of the large 
1. Crum, vr. L., Means, Y. C., ttconcentration of Economic 
Power", The American Economic Rev iew, March 1934, 
pages 69 - 8?. 
2~ Berle and Means, 11 The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property", page 35. 
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banking houses in New York wield can not be preperly es-
timated. H. W. Laidler makes a statement that would 
startle even Berle and Means. He says, "We find, there-
fore, that the credit .facilities of the nation are 
becoming increasingly concentrated. One percent of the 
banks of the country control nes.rly one half of the tota.l 
national resources. Concentration has recently been 
greatly advanced through the rapid consolidation of key 
banks of the country through the development of chain and 
branch banking, through the manipulation of the investment 
trust, through the industrial activities of private banks, 
and through other means. The unit bank is fast fading 
from the scene and America bids fair, sooner or later, to 
follow the example of England and Canada and other countries 
in the concentration of all banking power in a comparative-
ly few gigantic central banking institutions." 1 This 
tremendous growth of the large corporation requires some 
explanation. 
In the section on the economic aspects of combina-
tion, we have shown the many advantages which accrue to 
large-scale industry. But this is not the only factor, 
though perhaps the most important. Besides this point, 
Berle and Means state that the natural growth of industry 
accounts for part of the increase. Further, they assert 
that many subsidiaries did not consolidate their income 
1. H. w. Laidler, "Concentration of Control in American 
Industry, 11 pages 360 - 361. 
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statements with the parent company i~ the early years, and 
that in recent times they have done so. 
We have seen the general picture of the control 
which a few large corporations exercise over such a large 
amount of the national wealth . In general , the picture 
seems to be checked by data from two independent sources , 
namely the "Twentieth Century Fund Survey 1t and the Berle 
and Means study. These studies illustrate that the large 
corporations control about one half of the national pro -
duction facilities. But when we examine the public 
utilities, manufacturing , mining and allied industries , 
we find that the concentration is much greater than either 
of these studies indicates. We will state some examples 
in the public utility field and the manufacturing industry. 
Mr. H. w. Laidler, executive director of the 
League for Industrial Democracy, presents a rather compre-
hensive study of the exact extent of concentration and 
control in the most important branches of industry. Thi s 
study is not a generalized statistical study. On the con-
trary, an attempt is made to appraise the exact posit ion 
of the various corp oration "giants " in the different fields 
of industry. 
The automobile industry offers one of the best 
exruaples of the large growth of concentration in the manu-
facturing industry. It is one of the younges~and yet the 
largest single industry in the country. In 1890 the 
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industry did not exist. But in 1929 it had ru1 annual 
sales value of production which amounted to about three 
and one half' billion dollars, and there was about two 
billion dollars 1 capital invested in the business. las 
such a development spurred on by free competition? Is 
this great indus t ry decentralized and controlled by the 
investing public? Let us look at the present position of 
the industry today. 
tions 
According to H. W. Laidler, nin 1930 two corpora-
the Ford IVloto r Company and the General Motors 
Corporation sold around three-fourths of the cars pro-
duced in the United States; three corporations , ~-. : the 
F'ord , General Motors , and Chrysler Motors sold five-
sixths of the cars; and five corporations, nearly 90 
1 percent of them. 11 Such a concentration is indeed remark-
able and is one of the sensations of this industrial age. 
The General Motors Corporati on started in 1908 with 
five factories and a capitalization of $12,500,000. It had 
a steady and continuous development from then on. It 
gradually acquired othe r companies and the rights to produce 
their type of car until today it produces a complete line of 
cars for every pocket-book, from the Chevrolet to the expen-
s ive Cadillac. But this gigantic corporation, wh ich does a 
business of over one billion dollars a year, did not stop 
with controlling the automobile industry. It has spread 
1. H. w. Laidler, "The Concentration of Control in Ameri can 
Industry11 , page 174. 
102. 
into the electric refrigerator field, the airplane indus-
try, the gasoline industry, and the automobile parts 
business. 1'his organizati on, h owever, is not completely 
centralized. It centre.lizes those activities whi ch re-
quire coordinating, but whenever possible decentralization 
is instituted to strengthen the organization by the 
introduction of many topnotch executives. Laidler says, 
"General Motors has become an interesting combination of 
a vertical, horizontal, circular merger all rolled into 
1 
one. tt 
The story of the Ford Company is a picture of the 
business genius of Henry Ford. It has assets of three 
quarters of a billion dollars. It iS-a completely vertical 
trust controlled by the F'ord family. Ford has not at-
tempted to appeal to all pocketbooks but has tried to put 
the best car possible in the hands of the people who can 
afford only the lowest priced car. Ford's labor policies 
have been for open shop and, according to some, unenlight-
ened. This is universal throughout the automobile 
industry. In conclusion, Laidler says "It would require 
but a few further mergers before a state of monopoly exist -
ed,"2although competition is still keen in the field. 
The public utility field is .a special field where 
civic permission is required for a company 1 s operation and 
1. Laidler, H. Vi., "The Concentration of Control in Ameri-
can Industry", page 179. 
2. Ibid, page 190. 
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the number of companies has to be strictly limited in 
order to assure economic operation. The Ameri can Tele -
phone and Telegraph Company offers a striking example of' 
concentration in the field of telephone and telegraph 
communi cation. This company was organiz ed in 1885 by 
the Bell Company to take charge of its long-distance 
transmission. At that time it had $100,000 of common 
stock. Today it has assets of' $5,000,000,000; controls 
77 percent of all the telephones in the country; and re-
ceives seven-eighths of the total income in this industry, 
amounting to over a billion dollars a year. Such a 
large combination, with no competition to speak of, and 
nothing but t h e thought of regulation to control it, is 
a fine example of corporate concentration in the utility 
field. 
The statistical picture of the concentration of 
industry is very complicated . To say that it proves 
that industry is too concentrated, or that it is not con-
centrated at all, is not true. As the Twentieth Century 
Fund says, in its study of the problem, there are two 
aspects of the question. Neither aspect is true in it-
self', but both viewpoints must be kept in mind to get a 
proper valuation of the problem. 
It seems to me that the conclusions of Berle and 
Means are a trifle exaggerated. They state that"· .• 
the corporation with $90,000,000 of assets, or more, has 
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come to dominate most major industries, if not all indus-
1 
try, in the United States ." They further state that 
the half of indus t ry now concentrated is apt to be the 
characteristic of al l industry of the future ; and h~nce 
concentration is apt to become universal throughout all 
industry. An interesting principle is asserted: that 
free competition is changing to a so-called 11 duopolyu in 
many industries. It is asserted that production is be-
ing carried on more for use than previously. 
Continuing in this vein, Berle and Means state 
that the p ower in the hands of the few directors of the 
g iant corporations is so great , and effects the control 
of the destinies of so many people, that those institu-
tions have passed out of the realm of private enterprise 
into the field of social institutions whi ch should be 
more democratically controlled. The Twentieth Century 
report on concentration concurs with much of this para-
graph. It is concluded from that report that the power 
is too great in the hands of a few individuals. The 
mistakes of these individuals, no matter how slight, have 
a tremendous affect on the well -being of too many people. 
The phenomenon of the turnover of great industrial 
corporations is emphasized by the Twentieth Century Fund 
Survey. Sma l l businesses are not the only casualties of 
bankruptcy, for many large companies suffer the same misfor-
1. Berle and Means, 11 The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property", page 44. 
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tune. Vmile the large comb inations may be reorganized 
and continue with little change in management , at the 
same time it means that these companies are not obtain-
ing the end for whi ch they were formed, i.e. profits. 
It usually means a loss to investors, and hence t hey wil l 
think more carefully before entering large corporations 
just because of the size. This acts to a certain extent 
as a detriment to the financing of similar large corpora-
..... . . 
vJ.OnS J.n the future. 
Of t h e 101 largest industrial corporations in 
1919, t wenty either went into receivership or reorganiza-
tion before t h e end of 1934. Twelve of the 106 largest 
industrials in 1930 went into bankruptcy or receivership 
before the end of 1934. Seven of the 52 largest utility 
companies in 1930 went into receivership before the end of 
1934. Eleven of the 42 largest railroads in 1930 have 
g one into bankrupt cy. The Twentieth Century Fund contin-
ues, to say that 'tThe mortality rate among giant corp ora-
tions in the fifteen-year peri od from the beginning of 1920 
to the end of 1934 was 19.8 for industrials, 17. 4 percent 
1 
for utilities, and 29.2 for railroadsu. 
1. Twentieth Century Fund Committee, "Big Business, Its 
Growth and Place", page 102 
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Chapter VI 
THE SOCIAL PROBLEM Ol!, CORPORATE REGULATION 
The Development of Legal Regulation 
The evolution of the corporation, based as it is 
on a legal concept, is subject to governmental authority·· 
The corporation in the early days of its development offer-
ed few problems of social control. Vlliile this type of 
organization always had the great potentiality of growth 
and concentrated power, the economic enviro~~ent up until 
recent times effectually limited its growth. Although 
there were sporadic examples of large corporations, the 
widespread use of corporations for business control was 
insignificant. However, the cofporation in the past has 
exercised a signif.icant social effect. In Roman days 
the corporation was used to end the strife between the 
Romans and the Sabines. The real social influence of the 
corporation as a business unit began to be felt in the days 
of exploration in England. During that period, the 
strength of the corporate form succeeded in hazardous ven-
tures when private enterprise was powerless and the govern-
ment was not prepared to subsidize exploration directly. 
But even at that time, stock frauds and financial panics 
demanded stricter governmental control. 
Until recent times in our own country, regulation 
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of corporations has been avoided. T. E . Burton, in his 
book entitled "Corporations and the State", writes: 
"Heretofore t wo factors have made re gulation difficult 
of enactment. One, as already stated, has been the dis-
position of the people to give a free hand and generous 
franchises to corporate managers, under the impression 
tha t such a policy would rapidly promote the development 
of the country 's resources and t hereby greatly increase 
individual wealth. A second reason is found in the ne-
cessity for h i ghe r profits in many enterprises than are 
customary in more settled countries •••• Numerous enter-
prises have been undertaken here which have proved 
exceedingly successful as well as beneficial to the 
public, the capital for which could never have been en-
listed by the inducements of profits of 5 or 6 percent. 111 
In addition to the above underlying causes of 
limited legal control of corporations, there are several 
others. In t h e first place, legal precepts lag behind 
any new social principles. Secondly, the corporation, 
due to favorable economic circumstances, has expanded its 
activities, and hence power, on a scale undreamed of in 
t h e nineteenth century. As a result, certain aspects of 
corporate management are under criticism. Some authori-
ties claim that the corporation has revolutionized our 
whole economic and legal system. Floyd F. Burtchett says 
1. Burton, T. E., "Corporations and the State", page 49. 
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of our present corporation law (1934 ), 11 Corporation law 
in the United States in its present state is probably the 
most efficient that has ever existed, if the measure of 
efficiency be defeat of social control and frustration of 
public protection. Business perversionsof almost every 
conceivable variety continue, yet no public cry is raised 
in any state to effect an improvement in affairs • . . . 
One of the nation's foremost legal minds (Samuel Unter-
meyer) has described the existing state of corporation 
control in this way : 'Our corporation laws are without 
exception the loosest, most unjust and inadequate, and in 
every way the worst with whi ch any civilized nation is 
afflicted. They are a snare to the investor; minorities 
are helpless; they offer a premiun1 on dishonesty and 
furnish the safest and most fruitful :field to the criminal -
ly disposed exploiter for t he practice of fraud and 
oppression on the public. Every safeguard that other 
countries have thrown about their citizens have been re-
jected by us. From the birth to the death of the 
corporation, the system is utterly wrong and designedly 
, ,.1 
so. 
The above quotation may be exceedingly pessimistic 
but it serves forcefully to bring attention to t he fact 
that all is not well with corporate activities. Economists 
vary in their opinions of corporate regulations from this 
1. Burtchett, F. F ., "Corporation Finance 11 , pages 983, 984. 
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point to apologists for the present system and advocates 
of a complete hands -off poli cy in regard to the coru ora-
J: 
t ion by the g overnment. Fair-minded critics must 
observe t hat there are injustices and unfair practi ces 
connected with this type of business organizati on which 
must be corrected. The most important of these problems 
will be outlined and tentative solutions will be sketched. 
In discussing the social problems of the cor-
porate form of business organizati on, vve must include the 
interests of n ot only the people legally involved today, 
such as the bondholders and stockholders, but all others 
affected by the corporation. This includes professional 
managers, the consuming public, the wage earners, and the 
banking interest. While the interests of these groups 
are n ot recognized by the law, at the same time because 
of the pub lic interest in t he large corporation some 
co hs ideration of their interest must be given in any legis-
lation directed at correcting corporate abuses. 
The early h istory of commercial control was based 
on the co~~on law practice of prohibiting restraint of 
trade. Engross ing , regrating, and forestalling had been 
condemned as early as the fifteenth century in England. 
However , this comm on law regulation was n ot deemed suffi-
cient to prote ct t h e public interest in the last t wo 
decades of the nineteenth century. At that time the in-
dividual states began to enact legislation prohibiting 
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combinati ons and monopolies in restraint of trade. It 
is evident from this fact that t~enty years after the 
beginning of the combination movement, public r egulati on 
of comb inations dire ctly by statute and not by common 
law prohibition against the restraint of trade was deemed 
necessary. 
But state control was not adequate , to deal with 
the problem because of the limitation of jurisdiction to 
state boundaries in regulating nation-wide comb inations. 
The first g overnment a l step toward regulation of i ndustry 
was taken in 1887 with the passage of t h e Interstate 
Commerce Act. This act created t he Interstate Coramerce 
Commission for the regulation of the railroads. The 
federal gove rnment continued its policy of commercial 
regulation with the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
in 1890, acting under the constitutional power of 
Congress "to regulate commerce with f oreign nations and 
1 
among the several states. 11 
This Act is a pioneer landmark in the history 
of the cont rol of corporate combinations. One auth ority 
states that 11 the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is one of the 
most impo r tant measures ever enacted b y Congress. In 
sweeping te rms in a brief compas s it declares positively 
illegaf and criminal agreements in restraint of trade 
which at common law had only been void and unenforceable. 112 
1. Article I, Sec. 8, par. 3; Constitution of Uni t ed St at es 
2. Tippetts and Live rmore, 11 Business Organization and Con-
troln, page 380 . 
111. 
This is the essence of this Act. Th e other features of 
the act were the provisions made for its enforcement. 
The Attorney-General was authorized to institute and 
direct proceedings against illegal combinations. Juris-
diction over these cases was given to the United states 
Circuit Court. The act permitted any person injured by 
any act prohibited by this statute to recover threefold 
damages from the illegal combinations. The criminal 
penalties incurred by an infraction of this law were a 
fine of five thousand dollars or a year 1 s imprisonment 
or both, at the discretion of the court. Although this 
piece of legislation seemed to be capable of preventing 
illegal combinations, it was not satisfactory in accom-
plishing its purpose. Court decisions since that time 
have employed very liberal interpretations of this Act. 
From the time when this bill was passed until 
1914, much industrial legislation was considered by Con-
gress. A Bureau of Corporations was established in 
1903, the purpose of which was to secure greater publicity 
in corporate affairs. An act to expedite the detennina-
tion of cases under the Sherman Act was passed in 1903. 
The Elkins Anti-Rebate Act to prevent railroe.d rebates was 
passed in 1903. Proposals were made for the establish-
ment of a Federal Trade Commission. This was to become 
law during President Wilson's administration. The powers 
of the Interstate Com.r:1erce Commission were broadened by 
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the passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906 and the Mann-Elkins 
Act of 1910. The period following the enactment of the 
Sherman Law saw many futile and discouraging attempts at 
its enforcement. Reas ons for this may be found in the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act and the utiliza-
tion of the best legal talent in the country to defend the 
big companies . Profe ss or Watkins suggests that a cause 
for the limited success of the Act, in the early days, was 
that "the whole power for good in the legislation re~ted 
upon the attitude of each succeeding administration toward 
the problem. Under Cleveland and McKinley, very slight 
effort was made to enforce the law. 111 
The Addys on Pipe and Steel Company case in 1899 
was the first decision which gave indications that the 
Sherman Act might serve its purpose. The Northern Se-
curities Company case in 1904 by a slight majority , a 
5 to 4 decis i on, insured the effectiveness of this Act. 
This national holding company was declared a combinati on 
in restraint of interstate trade and international 
commerce, and hence illegal. 
The next important princip~e connected with the 
Sherman law is known today as the 11 rule of reason". This 
opinion was handed down in connection with the Standard 
,Oil Company of New Jersey case in 1911. The Supreme 
Court held that this holding company was a combinati on in 
1. Watkins, M. V:.l ., "Industrial Combinations and Public 
Policy 11 , page 251. 
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restraint of trade and it was ordered to dissolve. The 
most important principle of this case , "the rule of reason", 
had no real cause for being in the case as it was merely 
an obiter dictum. In many previ ous cases the min ority of 
the Court held that the Sherman law affected only unreason-
able restraint s of trade. But in 1911 the personnel of 
the Court had changed and the expounders of the 11 rule of 
reason" were in the maj ority. This interpretation of the 
Act was bitterly attacked. Mr . Justice Harlan stated, in 
a vigorous dissent, that the court had deprived the act of 
practical value as a defensive measure against the evils 
to be remedied. One authority states that 11 it is diffi-
cult to decide to what extent the adopti on of the 'rule of 
reason' has impaired the force of the Sherman Act. Some 
authorities feel that the act has as a result been rendered 
relatively impotent.' tr 1 That this interpretation was not 
intended by Congress is shown by the fact that a move to 
i nject the word tU.nreas onabl e'• into the act was rejected by 
the Judiciary Committee of the Senate. 
The year 1914 saw two important attempts to extend 
regulation over the large corporati ons. The passing of 
the Clayton Anti -Trust Law and the establislunent of the 
Federal Trade Commission. The Clayton Act was aimed at 
strengthening the anti-trust laws by prbhibiting certain 
unfair trade practices. The Federal Trade Commission was 
1. Tippetts and Livermore-, "Business Organization and 
Control 11 , page 409. 
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foFmed for the purpose of preventing unfair methods of 
competition in commerce. It was to assist the Attorney-
General in prosecuting trusts. 
The main object of the Clayton Act was to make 
definite prohibitions against certain unfair practices so 
that the developing combinations and trusts would be 
arrested in their incipience. This act referred partic-
ularly to four main subjects: local price .. discrimination, 
exclusive dealer agreements, tying contra cts, holding 
companies , and interlocking directorates. All of these 
practices and fonns of organization had been subject to 
extensive use by t he giant comb ination. :B'urthermore, 
these forbidden practices were important methods used in 
the combination movement. ·mile these methods of doing 
business are illegal and have disappeared in many cases, 
nevertheless because of t h e secret and devious ways by 
wh ich they can be camouflaged some are still fl-ourishing 
today. In add ition, the act has been subject to the 
interpretation of the courts. The phrase "to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in 
any line of commerce" is very difficult to define exactly. 
The Federal Trade Commission consists of a 
board of five men, appointed by the President. According 
to Section 5 of the Act, "unfair methods of competition in 
co1nmerce are hereby declared unlawful. The Commission is 
hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, 
115. 
partnerships, or corporations, except banks, and common 
carriers sub j ect to the acts to regulate commerce, from 
using unfair methods of competiti on in com .. rner ce." Th is 
act seemed to g o farther than the Clayton Act which for-
bid.s unfair methods of competit ion only if they tend to 
lessen competiti on or to further monopoly. One weakness 
of the act is that the evidently unfair practices of that 
time were not specifically enumerated. However, it was 
claimed that a general clause would be more flexible and 
adaptable to future developments in this field. 
In regard to the enforcement of the act, the 
Commission has the right to issue "ce a se and desist 11 
orders after a hearing has been held . If the offending 
party will not stop, the Commission may apply to the 
Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States . The de-
cision of the Court is enforced by no particular penalty. 
Howev er, if the culprit wi ll not obey the Court he will 
be in cont empt of court and subject to punishment accord-
ingly. In a majority of the cases , defendant corp ora-
tions have not contested the orders of the Commission. 
This Co1nmi ssion has undertaken to prohibit many 
unfair methods of competition. The elimination of 
interlocking direc t orates has proved very difficult be-
cause of the intang ible way in which such control may be 
manifest. This body, h owever, has done much to restrict 
unfair sales and price policies. - such~ practices .: as 
11 6 . 
misbranding, misrepresentative adverti s ing, and false 
packaging. Res a le price maintenance \Vas considered 
illegal up unt il recently . Today the Miller - Tydings 
Act permits manufacturers to force retailers to maintain 
whatever price t he manufacturers set. Price discrimina -
tion has been at tacked, and t he basing point system for 
fi guring the selling pri ce (such as is used in the steel 
industry, the "Pittsburgh Plus" system) has been 
eliminated. 
Although much of the commission's work has been 
done in t he field of small business, it h as neverthel ess 
p r oduced cons tructive results. Tippetts and Livermore 
s t at e that "impartial criticism wi ll point out t hat the 
commission must of necessity be increasingly occupied with 
its policing dut ies, which restrain the more palpable de-
vices that interfere with free competitive conditions. In 
that field it has proven to be effective, and there a tre-
mendous amount of work awaits it constantly. It has d one 
and can do but li tt le to stem t h e t ide of concentration of 
1 
control over business into a fevJ hands ." It is evident 
from this st2.tement that the commission has done an effec-
tive job in eliminating unfair meth ods of competit ion, but 
that i t is t oo limited to achieve significant results in 
the fi eld of social control over business. There are a 
number of other commissions, which supplement the \7ork of 
1. Tippetts and Livennore , "Business Organ i zation and Con-
trol", page s 604 , 605. 
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the l!,ederal Trade Corrunission . The ]'ederal Radio Com.'Ilis-
sion exerci ses power over a h i ghly concentrated field of 
broadcasting and allied industries. The Federa l Power 
CoiD.mission exerciBes jurisdiction over the licenses of 
power sites on navigable rivers. The Federal Reserve 
Board exercises supervision over national banks and state 
banks whi ch are members of the Federal Reserve System. 
The most important facts relating to the public 
control of industry the Sherman Anti -Trust Act, the 
Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission have 
been pointed out. It will be noted that these acts are 
concerned mainly with combinations restraining trade and 
unfair competitive trade practices. The period between 
1920 and 1930 was one of prosperity, and as a result in-
dustrial legislation was largely forgotten i n the general 
pursuit of profits . But the recent New Deal cycle of 
business legislation has to do with n ew and diversified 
problems. 
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Chapt e r VII 
CONCLUSION 
Contemporar~ Problems 
The modern corporation of large size presents 
many problems of social control. In considering the 
question, it i s evident that regulation should be directed 
at elementary abuses of the co r porate system. Evils such 
as ineff icient service, high prices, etc. may resul t from 
anti-social abuses or they may, in certain cases, be the 
resul t of poor bus iness meth ods. Th e eradication of these 
evils insofar as t h ey are against public policy is the ob-
ject of all r egul a t ory leg islation. But the leg islative 
proposals are not aimed at lowering p rices or increasing 
t h e standa rds of service directly, but are directed against 
certRin abuses of corporate management, although it is 
probable that if certain abuses in management are corre ct ed 
t h ere vJill be considerable benefit to the consurning public 
and investor. In t he long run, the spirit of corporate 
regulation will reflect t h e socia l spirit of the people. 
In our consideration of corpora t e abuses, we will 
emphas ize some of the most important ones. The number o:f 
evils and t h e extent of misuse of the corporation is very 
large. (Professor Hane y lists ove r 25.) The first op-
por tunity for abus e of t h e corporat e form of business is to 
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be f'om1.d in t h e chartering power of' the 48 individual 
states. New J ersey in the 1890's found that if it 
liberalized its incorporation laws the fees from the busi-
ness of incorporating would be a considerable part of the 
tax income of t h e state. The first step in thi s direction 
was the amending of t h e corporation laws to permit h olding 
companies. Th i s form of combination has since offered 
many problems of socia.l control. The laws of one state 
must automatically be recognized by all oth er states. Of 
course, interstate comraerce is subject to federal control 
but lit t le has be en done in this field outside of what was 
previously mentioned. As a result of t h is condition, 
states vie with one another to pass lax and at t ractive in-
corporation statutes for the corporate promoter. Delaware 
and New Jersey are particular ly notorious for their corpora-
tion laws. 
The loose statutes take many and varied forms. 
According to Professor Ripley, Delaware "has always been 
forward in the chartermongering business. The charges 
for service by the Delaware Registration Trust Company of 
Wilmington 'for maintaining the principal office, acting 
as registered agent, exposing the sign, acting as custodian 
of the duplicate stock ledger, g iving notices of stockhol-
ders meetings, furnishing annual report blanks' and so 
forth are fift y dollars a year if t h e capital does not ex-
1 
ceed $1,000,000." Continuing h is attack on the charter 
1. Ripley, 4. z., "Main Street and Wall Street", pag e 30. 
120. 
mongering tactics of certain states, he said "It is bit 
by bit from a timid proposal in a single venturesome state 
that no-par stock has reached its present widespread ac-
ceptance; it is t hus t hat the traditional right of the 
stockholders to a prior participation in all nevi security 
issues has been, little by little, so grievously abridged; 
thus it has come about that the practice of legalizing new 
issues by a majority vote either of stock present or voting 
or by a mere majority of the total number of shareholders 
has crept in. The worst abuse of holding company finance 
crept in, it may be, to get rid of an inconvenient accumu-
lation of unpaid preferred di~idends or, perhaps, surrepti-
tiously to appropriate an undisclosed surplus in some 
1 
corporate treasury." 
One of the most important problems relating to the 
corporation t oday is one of the separation of control from 
·the stockholders or owners. This problem is particularly 
connected with the giant corporation. Although these cor-
porations are relatively few in number, compared with all 
corporations, at the same time the amount of wealth control-
ed and the potentiality for concentration which this type of 
organization possesses is very great. The methods through 
which control has been removed from the hands of the owners 
have been expounded in the section entitled "The Chang ing 
Methods of Corporate Control 11 • 
Berle and Means, in their study of "The Modern 
1. Ripley, Vi! . z., uMain Street and Wall Street", page 33. 
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Corporation and Private Property", bring out very strongly 
the point that control of the giant corporation is in the 
hands of a few men, and that the real owners have lost what-
ever control they may have had in the past,in the big cor-
poration of today. This book has had an important affect 
on governmental officials and legislators, and has been 
frequently quoted as a result. Senator 0 1Mahoney of 
Wyoming said, in a radio address 6n August 25, 1935 in re-
gard to t h is subject, uif you are a stockholder in any 
national corporation engaged in national commerce, let me 
ask you what voice or represent~tion you have on the board 
of directors of the corporation in which you have invested 
your savings. The answer, unless you are yourself a mem-
ber of the board, is none; and this is true whether you own 
voting stock or non-voting stock, preferred stock or bonds; 
you are actually without representation in the corporation 
to which you have committed your future." 1 
The question of whether or not this is a benefi-
cial development for the general public is a moot question. 
Many authorities regard the concentration of control of 
large economic units with misgivings. But even some of 
these auth orities are loath to expound or demand any radi-
cal changes in the present system. The reason for this 
being that our economic system is so mutually interdepend-
ent that there is no way of telling what the final results 
1. 0 1Mahoney, Senator J. C., "A Constitution for Corpora-
tions't, Congressional Record, August 25, 1935. 
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would be. 
The financial management of corporations has 
always presented opportunities for the exploitation of 
the stockholder and, indirectly, the general public. 
Under this heading we find two principal problems of cor-
poration finance. The first is in the promotional abuses 
such as watered stock, overcapitalization, and the undue 
influence of banking institutions in the control of the 
corporation. The second problem has to do with the gen-
eral financial policy of the company. This includes the 
dividend policy and the dilution of the corporate equity. 
OVercapitalization 11 is defined as a condition in 
a business in which there is an excess of the value of 
securities shown on the books over the value of assets of 
1 
the concern." The stock so diluted is known as watered 
stock. There is a definite problem concerned in deter-
mining what the proper capitalization should be. Should 
the cost of the original investment, the current valuation, 
or the cost of replacement of the assets be used as a basis 
for capitalization? But in many companies it is very ap-
parent that overcapitalization exists. In an example 
stated previously, the United States Steel Corporation had 
$700,000,000 of pure watered stock in the reorganization 
which took place in 1901. 
One of the principal evils connected with overcap-
italization is the maintenance of higher prices for products 
1. Burtchett, F. F., "Corporation Finance", pages 989-990. 
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so that dividends can be paid on the watered stock. Of 
course, the real owners then lose what would naturally 
be their profit, by a dilution of their equity. Frequent-
ly watered stock is used to pay promotional expenses. This 
stock is foisted on the gullible public later on. Fre-
quently ove r capitalization puts such a strain on the corpor-
ation that its financial position is weakened in the market . 
The function of promotion is generally regarded as 
useful and beneficial to the public, but this field seems 
to have attracted its full quota of men with a flair for 
risky legal manipulation. "Promotion may be defined as a 
discovery of business opportunity and the subsequent organ-
ization of funds, property, and managerial ability into a 
business concern for the purpose of making a profit there-
1 from. 11 V~'hy, then, is promotion a problem of social 
regulation? 
Professor Hoagland lists nine evils of promotion 
whi ch are the cause of dissatisfaction wi th the corporate 
enterprise . In stunmary, the y are as follows: primarily, 
there are no restrictions on who shall promote and ·who 
shall not. He says that "inexperience, shady reputation, 
or lack of financial backing is no bar to attempting the 
sale of all sorts of securities to unwary investors.u 2 
1. Gersternberg, c. W., "Financial Organization and 
Management of Business 11 , pages 1 and 2. 
2. Hoagland , H. E., 11 Corporation Finance 11 , pages 533 - 534. 
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Secondly, promoters have only a speculative interest in 
the enterprise they promote. 11 Sell out and get out is 
1 
frequently their motto.n Thirdly, promoters' profits 
are frequently excessive, and scant profits are often ob-
tained for the owners. In conclusion, management 
frequently pays dividends on promoters' watered stocks 
from invested capital, wrongfully allocated to surplus. 
Dividend policies are usually dictated by motives 
of a fair return on invested capital . Frequently, however, 
various devices are resorted to which permit financial 
managers to withlLold earnings from those properly entitled 
to them. Holders of non-cumulative preferred stock and 
income bonds are frequent victims of management controlled 
by common stock interests. In the case of mergers and 
consolidations, the rights of certain groups of security 
holders are favored over others. In addition to this, 
management may dilute the equity of one group of sharehold-
ers if the preemptive rights of the owners are not strictly 
controlled and followed up. 
The holding company form of organization presents 
an important problem in the field of social regulation of 
the corporation. Floyd F. Burtchett says, of the holding 
company, "Cumulated corporate structures, one above the 
other, characteristic in the post-war decade of credit pros-
perity in the United States, have presented the holding 
1. Hoagland, H. E., ttcorporation :B'inance 11 , page 534. 
company as an engine of :financial iniquity which :few 
imagined possible.ul As stated in the section on the 
-
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"Corporation and the Modern Combination Movement 11 , the 
holding company has many advantages in a large-scale 
industry and in the public utility :field. 
Th e principal problem which this type of com-
bination offers is the concentrated control of a large 
field of industry. Bonbright and Means say that 11 The 
holding company is the most effective device that has 
ever been invented for combining und.er single control and 
management the properties of two or more independent cor-
porations. It has , therefore, made possible t he develop-
ment of giant systems of business enterprise at a pace far 
more rapid than would have been feasible by an¥ other 
method of concentration."Z This type of business organiza-
tion is readily adaptable to, and facilitates the concentra-
tion of, control in the hands of a few. This characteristic 
is covered more fully in preceding paragraphs. 
Two oth er evils connected with the holding company 
are pyran1iding and issuance of poorly secured stocks and 
bonds. An attempt was made to restrict these abuses in the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. The holding 
company offers a powerful instrument of control when used to 
manage affiliated subsidiaries, but when a holding company 
is used to hold stock in other holding compan ies, the power 
1. Burtchett, F. F., "Corporation Finance", page 991 • 
. 
2. Bonbright and Means, "The Holding Company", page 4. 
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be comes excessive in most cases . This pra ctice i s kn own 
as pyramiding and can be extended to what is called t hree 
and. four-story h olding company organizations. The 
issuance of securities backed by b onds or fixed assets of 
subsid i aries of little value is a pr&ctice wh ich should 
be reformed. Under the h olding company a ct of 1935 the 
issuance of securities is strictly limited and put under 
the control of the Se curit ies and Exchange Co1nmittee. 
Most of the problems stated in t h is section are 
conne ct ed with each other , usually i n more t han one way . 
For example, promotiona l abuses may occur in the forma -
ti on of a holding company which tend toward concentrat ion 
of control in the hands of a few. Man y of these laxities 
are undoubtedly due in ce rta i n cases t o the competiti on 
among states f or t he business of incorporat ing. The prob -
lem of corporat ion control has been ca lled 11 a veritable 
labyrinth 11 by one author. The complexi t y of t he p icture 
cannot be ove remphas ized. Any one p iece of leg islation 
will n ot end all t he p roblems connected with the corp ora -
ti on. In our dis cussion of the p roblems conn ected with 
the s ocia l abuses of the . co rp orati on we have tried to 
bring out the mos t important aspe c ts of a large subje c t . 
It must further be underst ood that in the main we have 
considered the problem of the corporate giants , but it 
must be remembered that the vast maj ority of co rporati ons 
are s mall and n ot subject t o all of the ab ovementi oned 
abuses . 
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In con cluding the picture, a ·word must be said 
in regard to t he lack of information available to the 
stockh olders. Fre q,uently informati on is issued by eli-
rectors wi th the purp ose of propagandizing and forcing 
stockholde rs to some part icular acti on . Lack of 
uniformity of reports and information with which to 
interpret reports offer another obstacle to i ntelligent 
ac t ion by the stockholders. Frequently, the method of 
valuing assets is withheld, thus making t he balance 
sheet uninterpretable. St ockholders are oftentimes 
handicapped by a delay in securing informat ion. Pro:fes-
sor Hoagland states tha t "Mont hly ea r n ings of American 
railroads are available to the pub lic about six weeks in 
arrears, to insiders ab out one week i n arrears." 1 Th is 
gives a big opportunity to insiders to capi talize on this 
private information. Many important events in the life 
of t he corporat ion are completely hidden until a slip is 
made by some off icer and an i nvestigation is instituted, 
as in the case o:f the McKess on Robbins Corporation ca se. 
Of course, there is another side to the question 
of pub licity of the corporation. If vi t al i nfonnation 
is publ icised, it is a.Mai lable to the competit ors of that 
particular company. Such reports often rev eal weaknesses 
wh ic:h competitors seize on to their advantage. Professor 
Ripley speaks of the situation in this way : 11 Two or three 
adversaries wat ching ea ch other like cats spoiling for a 
1. Hoagland, H. E ., "Corporation Financen, page 532 
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1 fray, each with an eye to quick advantage over the othe r. 11 
As long as such a condition exists, it is evident that the 
ordinary stockholder cannot exercise much control over the 
corporation. An attempt has been made to make investment 
information available to a governmental agency, the Securi -
ty and Ex change Commission, before st ocks are listed in 
the exchanges . This is a step in t h e right direction but 
it offers no solution in regard to the problem of current 
information. 
S~gg ested Methods of Corporate Regulation 
The problem of corporate regulation is very com-
plex and important. Because of the tremendous growth of 
certain corporations and their nation-wide influence, 
federal regulation is required. Most critics of the 
present corporate system agree with this point of view. 
The methods of corporate reform take many and varied ap-
proaches to the questi on . Theodore Burton, in his b ook 
entitlecl the 11 Corporation and the State 11 , divides the 
problem into four elementary divisions. He says, 11 There 
are four ways in wh ich the state can deal with corpora-
tions. The first is to leave them alone and allow them 
a free course. The second is to destr9y them; the third, 
to regulate them ; and the fourth, to acquire and own them. 112 
1. Ripley, VT. 
2 . Burton, 1'. 
z., 
"R • 
.u • I 
11 IVIain Street and - ~all Street 11 , page 209. 
11 Corporation and the State 11 , page 124. 
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Other authors offer different divisions but these seem 
to be the best and most all-inclusive categories. 
In regard t o the first division, which includes 
those critics who advocate a hands-off policy by the 
government, we find many corporation directors and mana-
gers . These advocates of a laissez-faire attitude of 
governmental policy point out the early growth of industry 
in this country, when industry was unhampered by govern-
mental intervention. Undoubtedly this attitude was 
predominant in the philosophy up until very recent times. 
But recently the problem has become so complex that 
business itself, with all its responsibilities, has n ot 
been able t o s olve it. In addition, the abuses of cor-
porate management which have been accepted in the past 
because of the greater advantages of ec onomic development, 
have disappeared. Hence , we devote little space to this 
section of corporate reform. 
The second division , which is concerned with the 
destruction of the corporation, is a logical division of 
corporate legislation but is of little constructi~e signif-
icance, Furthermore , a plan of this sort would infer 
that the corporations have more defects than advantages, 
and as such are not worth reconstruction. 
The third and fourth plans of governmental regula-
tion and ownership have many advocates and are worthy of 
considerati on at some length. Goverrunental regulation is 
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probably the most important section, inasmuch as it is 
more i n harmony with our demo.crati c form of' g overnment 
and the spirit of' the people. However , nationa~iza­
tion of' industry as a panacea for present economic 
problems has many advocates. Many f or~ign governments 
have gone far in this direction, with varying degrees of 
success 
ful. 
none of which has been outstandingly success-
In the field of g overnmental ownership of' in-
dustry, we find many variations in the different plans . 
It is not the scope of this exposition to go into these 
details. Perhaps the t wo most important examples o:f 
nationalized industry are the system of state socialism 
in Russia and of corporate fascism in Italy. In both 
t !1ese experiments, there were certain unique conditions 
wh i ch made such developments pos sible . The success of 
these systems is questionable. Advocates o:f the systems 
hold that a sufficient trial has not been given them but 
that, considering the conditions surrounding the experi-
ments , many benefits have been derived from them. The 
main difficulty with both systems has been the abrogation 
of all democratic political pr ivilege. 
,An interesting development of t his principle of 
nationalization of industry whi ch would be more suitable to 
the Ameri can method of government is presented by Paul M. 
O'Leary of Cor~ell University in his book entitled 
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11 Corporat e }J}nte rprise in Hod e rn Economic Life". He d oes 
not claim t hat h is idea is more t han a mere suggestion 
for corporate reform. He advocates that a national cor-
pora tion be formed that is, a h olding company. The 
financing of all large corpora tions would be t h rough t h is 
national corpora tion. Th e h olding company would secure 
co1~on s t ock of all compani e s financed,in proportion to 
t he fi nancial aid g iven. He further states, uThe national 
holding company should be managed by the National Econ omic 
Council, which seems almost destined t o be created in t h e 
United States, or by the appropriate sub-agency thereof. 111 
He further explains, "In other words, large private enter-
prises mi ght be formed as they now are, but they would 
have to be financed by a small numb er of men wh o would own 
2 
t h em, understand them, and manage them. 11 In t h is plan, 
inve s t ment would be made h i gh l y secure and the rate of in-
t e rest would be limited. Opportunit y for private 
enterprise would still be open to men using the small cor-
poration with little or no diversified ownership. 
Vihen reflecting on the general subject of indus-
trial regulation, we must remember that no one solution of 
the problem will correct the situation completely. If 
one problem is solved, others will spring up to follow it. 
:B,urth ermore, as M. W. Watkins says in his book entitled 
1. 0 1Leary, P. M., "Corporate Enterprise in Modern Econom-
ic Life", page 117. 
2. Ibid, page 116. 
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11 Industrial Combinations and Publi c Policy", "Differences 
in the conditions of production and marketing in the 
various l ines of industry are so manifest and so great 
that the adopting of one particular policy and its en-
forcement everywhere would be, clearly, dogmatic and not 
l 
a solution in any sense." 
In considering the subject of goverrunental regu-
lation of industry, we find there are three divisions 
generally made in the subject. The first division con-
sists of a policy of compuls ory compet ition enforced by 
judicial proceedings. This method of controlling the big 
combinations was embodied in the Sherman Act. This 
policy limits governmental action to eliminating every 
obstruction to competition in industry. The fact that 
monopoly already exists is a prerequisite to the function-
ing of the g overnment in its controlling capacity. 
Opponents of this plan point out the futility of 
enforcement of the Sherman Act and similar acts passed by 
state legislatures. They point out that when public 
indignation is aroused by some flagrant abuse, the attar-
ney-general investigates. In the process of his 
investigation, one or t wo luckless companies may be con -
victed, and the trade in general tries to cover up its 
illegal activities. But when the investigation subsides 
the trade reverts to its previous practi ces. Of course, 
1. Watkins, M. w., 11 Industrial Combinations and Public 
Policy", page 279. 
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this d oes not condem..."YJ. the policy as a whole but merely 
shows its weaknesses and needs for development. 
The second method of reform is concerned with 
administrative regulation. Such a plan is based on the 
failure of competition because of its inherent wasteful-
ness. Proceeding on this assumption, the advocates of 
this plan believe that g over1unent should regulate the 
ter.ms and conditions of industry rath er than per.mittin~ 
the unchecked private management of such monopolies. 
Such a p olicy would be actualized in methods such as price 
regulation, or taxation of monopoly profits. In regard 
to price regulation, Tippetts and Livennore say that such 
a policy should not extend to all industry but only to 
monopolies whi ch are declared to be affected with publi c 
interest. 
Of course, the problem of administering such a 
program would be very difficult. Th e determination of a 
"fair return on fair value" would not be easy. Such a 
problem is now being studied in relation to public utility 
rates by the g ove rrunent. Attempts to establish excess 
profit taxes have met wi th much difficulty and opposition 
by the present aruninistrati on. In addition to these dif-
ficulties, the question of preventing the passing on of 
such taxes to the consumer is difficult to solve. 
A plan of administrative supervision is one in 
which proposed plans of combination would be submitted to 
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a g overnment agency before they we re put into operation. 
Businessmen have long complained of the indefiniteness of 
the anti-trust laws. Such a plan was put i nt o practice 
in a limited way during the Coolidge administration. At 
that time the Attorney-General examined a number of such 
plans before they were put into operation. Of course, 
the acceptance of such plans by the Attorney-General did 
not make them legal, for that prerogative lies within the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
The third division to the subject of governmental 
r egulat ion is known as the policy of legislative regula-
tion and administrative supervision of compet ition. This 
vms the policy of the Wilson administration. Professor 
\7atkins says, "It is not the last stopping-place for 
private responsibility in industrial aation, but it is the 
last alternative in whi ch ~eliance is placed upon the spon-
taneous adjustments of competitive interest to direct the 
1 
economic process." The administrative investigations and 
activities of the Federal Trade Co1mnissi on are an example 
of the way such a policy operates, backed up by the anti-
trust legislation. 
The mea sure of Senat or 0 1 Mahoney, wh ich is nov1 
before Congress , is another development of this third pol-
icy of combined legal and administrative regulation. This 
bill requires all corporations of $100,000 capital or more, 
1. Watkins, M. W., "Industrial Combination and Public 
Policy 11 , page 277. 
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doing interstate business, to obtain a license from t h e 
federal government. Senator 0 1Mah oney states t hat t h e 
-
purpose of h is bill is "to re gulate interstate and 
foreign commerce by prescribing the condit ions under which 
corporations may engage in such commerce, to provide for 
and define additional powers and dut i es of t he Federa l 
1 
Trade Commission, and for other purposes. 11 
In order to receive a licens e a corporation must 
comply with t he re gulations in the act. Some of t he most 
important of t h ese are the follovling : comprehensive re-
ports must be submitted to the Federal Trade Coruni s sion 
concerning all vital activities of t h e business. No il-
legal corporation under t h e anti-trust laws will receive 
a license. Th e p relimina ry conditions to obtaining a 
license restrict ch ild labor and the discriminating against 
woman employees. One of t h e major provisions enables 
all stock, whethe r p reviously non-voting or not, to be 
elig ible to vote. A second section provides for the 
creating of certified corporation representa tives to vote 
proxies i f t h e stockh older wishes. Enforcement of the 
act was put in the hands of the At torn ey-General, under 
wh ose auspices the Commission's orders wi l l be subject to 
judicial review in t h e courts. 
In concluding t h is section i t is evident that t h e 
corporation has developed according to the economic needs 
1. 0 1Mahoney, J. c., Senate Bill 330, Jan. 5, 1939, p. 1 
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and the social spirit of the people. As man's social 
and economic life bec~me more complex , the ramifications 
of corporate organizat ion and finance naturally became 
more difficult to understand and manage. New problems 
arise ·with each new phase in man's development. As a 
result, cbrporate regulations must be cont i nually revised 
and elaborated to meet the new conditions confronting 
them. Inasmuch as the benefits of the corporation far out-
weigh the disadvantag~s of this type of organization, the 
basic policy of corporate regulation in the future should 
be to keep what is worthwhile in the corporate form and 
eliminate the evils from it. 
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